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Abstract 
We explore how party structures can condition the benefits of decentralization in 
modern democracies. In particular, we study the interaction of two political 
institutions: democratic (de)centralization (whether a country has fiscally 
autonomous and elected local governments) and party (non)integration (whether 
power over local party leaders flows upwards through party institutions, which we 
model using control over candidate selection). We incorporate these institutions 
into our strong decentralization theorem, which expands on Oates (1972) to 
examine when the decentralized provision of public services will dominate 
centralized provision even in the presence of inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Our 
findings suggest that, when externalities are present, democratic decentralization 
will be beneficial only when parties are integrated. In countries with non-integrated 
parties, we find that the participation rules of primaries have implications for the 
expected gains from democratic decentralization. Under blanket primaries, Oates’ 
conventional decentralization theorem holds but our strong decentralization 
theorem does not. By contrast, when primaries are closed, not even Oates’ 
conventional decentralization theorem holds. 
Keywords: decentralization, fiscal federalism, formal theory, political parties, 
public goods 
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In the last few decades, numerous countries – China, Indonesia, South Africa, India, the 
United Kingdom, and many others – have engaged in decentralization reforms. These reforms, at 
least in the developing world, have been supported both by the aid dollars of multilateral 
agencies such as the World Bank and USAID, and by the research findings of many scholars. 
Central to these positive scholarly judgments is the “decentralization theorem,” which was 
developed by Oates (1972) and states that “. . . in the absence of cost-savings from the 
centralized provision of a (local public) good and of inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of 
welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of 
consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is 
maintained across all jurisdictions” (p.54). 
However, as the process of decentralization has continued apace, some scholars have 
begun to question whether devolving authority to regional and local governments is a universal 
good. Among other things, they have pointed out that Oates, in developing his theorem, assumes 
not only the absence of economies of scale and externalities, but also that policies are 
implemented by benevolent welfare-maximizing governments. While this latter assumption may 
be useful for creating a simple and elegant theory of decentralization, it hardly accords with 
empirical realities. More to the point, it begs the question of how different political processes and 
institutions might shape the fiscal choices made by policy makers, and, with them, the outcomes 
of fiscal federalism.  
In this paper we seek to answer that question by analyzing the interaction of two 
particular political institutions: democratic (de)centralization (whether a country has fiscally 
autonomous and elected local governments) and party (non)integration (whether power over 
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local party leaders flows upwards through party institutions to leaders at the national level, which 
we model using candidate selection procedures).1 We incorporate these institutions into a 
rigorous and formal extension of Oates (1972), which we term our strong decentralization 
theorem. 
Our findings suggest that, when public goods have externalities, a move towards 
democratic decentralization will only produce the benefits predicted by Oates if parties are 
integrated. When local governments are elected and autonomous, their leaders possess the 
accountability necessary to incentivize public goods provision, but when national party leaders 
also control access to the ballot, local leaders have strong reasons to provide the efficient level of 
goods even when their benefits spillover across jurisdictions. Put differently, democratic 
(de)centralization affects public spending because local elections and nationwide elections create 
different incentives for the officials who design public policy. Upward accountability through 
integrated party mechanisms can influence these incentives. 
Narrowing our focus to non-integrated parties, we also study how the institutions of 
primary elections shape decisions over public spending. We find that the participation rules of 
primaries, whether closed or blanket, have important implications for the expected gains from 
democratic decentralization. Blanket primaries are an extreme form of open primary in which the 
top two candidates, regardless of party, compete in the general election.2 Under such system, 
democratic decentralization only produces the expected benefits when inter-jurisdictional 
spillovers are absent. By contrast, when primaries are closed, not even Oates’ conventional 
                                               
1 Note that, in Ponce et al. 2018, we use the term “party (de)centralization” for a similar concept. As we explain later 
in this paper, we adopt the term “party (non)integration” here because it corresponds more closely to our intended 
meaning and is consistent with the use of the term in our recent book, Hankla et al. 2019. 




decentralization theorem holds, meaning that democratic decentralization will produce no 
consistent benefits vis-à-vis centralized provision. This is because, in a closed primary system, 
parties will hew too closely to the specific preferences of their local co-partisans rather than to 
the aggregate interests of all constituents. 
This article contributes to the extensive literature on decentralization in two important 
ways. First, it significantly expands the main theoretical construct in fiscal decentralization—
Oates’s decentralization theorem—by showing that under the right political institutions, the 
fiscally decentralized provision of local public goods can be more efficient even in the presence 
of inter-jurisdictional externalities. It also shows that under certain political institutions, Oates’s 
decentralization theorem does not continue to hold. Second, and more generally, the paper 
clearly demonstrates that different forms of decentralization—fiscal versus democratic versus 
party – are closely intertwined and cannot be analyzed separately, as has been previously done in 
most of the literature. 
Given the extensive variation in party organization that exists in the real world, these 
findings are of great empirical significance. Of the 157 countries that we have coded for our 
empirical work (see Hankla et al. 2019; Ponce et al. 2018), 106 were characterized by some 
degree of democratic decentralization. Of these 106, sixty-seven countries have had integrated 
parties for at least some years and forty-nine have consistently had non-integrated parties  
We structure the rest of the article as follows: The second section reviews the relevant 
previous literature. The third section contains a summary and detailed explanation of the main 
findings of our theory. The fourth section includes a benchmark model in which local public 
goods are efficient and match the heterogeneous preferences over public spending from voters. 
The fifth section incorporates the analysis of party integration and democratic centralization. The 
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sixth section studies the case of party integration and democratic decentralization. The seventh 
section contains the introduction of our analysis of non-integrated parties. The eight section 
considers the case of nonintegrated parties and democratic centralization. The ninth section 
studies non-integrated parties and democratic decentralization. The tenth section develops a 
comparative analysis between democratic centralization versus decentralization in economies 
with non-integrated parties. The final section concludes. 
Literature Background 
There has been considerable previous research on the role of political institutions in 
public goods delivery, but most of it has concerned the national level. In this vein, scholars have 
investigated the impact of a number of specific institutions (e.g., electoral systems, legislative-
executive relations, legislative and coalition party fragmentation) on policy outcomes such as 
government spending, free trade, balanced budgets, and economic growth (see Persson and 
Tabellini 2003, O’Halloran 1994, Nielson 2003, Haggard and Kaufman 1995, Hallerberg and 
Marier 2004, Roubini and Sachs 1989, and Volkerink and de Haan 2001). Work on the influence 
of political institutions on subnational public goods delivery has been much sparser, as we 
discuss below. 
Researchers focused on decentralization, for their part, have examined the relationship 
between the organization of parties, on the one hand, and the devolution of state power, on the 
other. For example, Chhibber and Kollman (2004) make the case that countries decentralizing 
authority to the subnational level are likely to have more localized party systems, while Fabre et 
al. (2005) find that such countries will also be characterized by more decentralized parties.  
Perhaps William Riker is the most prominent scholar to have taken up this question. He 
argues in his 1987 book that the American “decentralized party system is the main protector of 
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the integrity of states in our federalism” (p. 221).3 By contrast, Filippov, Ordeshook, and 
Shvetsova (2004) emphasize the benefits of more integrated parties, making the case that party 
systems, which successfully link the national and sub-national levels of government, are the best 
guarantors of a stable federal system. Myerson (2006) concurs with the latter authors, arguing 
that regional and local elections provide opportunities for potential national candidates to prove 
themselves at the sub-national level. 
Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem has also inspired considerable work in the last 
few decades. While its assumption of benevolent public officials has been confronted in the 
“second generation” of research on decentralization, however, few scholars have examined 
which political institutions support the social welfare gains expected from the theorem.4 In 
particular, second generation scholars have tended to focus on the problems of assignment and 
soft budget constraints, and much less on the relationship between specific political institutions 
at the subnational level and the efficient provision of local public goods in fiscally decentralized 
systems. 
Despite these limitations, recent work on the political economy of fiscal federalism 
highlights the need to examine more closely how political institutions can influence the expected 
gains from decentralization (see Lockwood 2015). For instance, Lockwood (2002) uses a model 
of legislative bargaining to show that welfare is not increasing with higher spillovers under 
centralization, which is one of the main advantages of centralization suggested by Oates (1972). 
Lockwood (2008) studies whether the decentralization theorem holds when collective choices 
are made by majority rule and lobbying, and Bordignon et al. (2008) characterize conditions in 
                                               
3 See also Volden 2004 for an excellent summary of Riker’s thought on Federalism. 




which lobbying through campaign contributions induces a decentralized provision that is not 
Pareto efficient when politicians become too greedy. 
Even more to the point, Besley and Coate (2003), in a legislative model, show that local 
public goods are not automatically Pareto efficient since public spending maximizes the utility of 
a median voter instead of a social welfare function. This outcome means that the decentralization 
theorem identified by Oates (1972) is not necessarily compatible with the electoral incentives of 
politicians. However, in spite of their focus on the role of legislatures in fiscal decentralization, 
Besley and Coate (2003) do not consider how the structures of political parties influence public 
spending behavior. In this paper, we develop such an analysis.  
Other contributions in political economy have focused on providing rationales for the 
superiority of fiscal decentralization that are distinct from the one provided by Oates (1972). For 
instance, scholars have argued that fiscal decentralization is preferable because of its impact on 
corruption (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000),), accountability (Seabright 1996), and, under certain 
conditions, government capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002).  
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) is one rare study that focuses on the political and 
institutional conditions under which decentralization can deliver on its promises. These scholars 
argue convincingly that fiscal decentralization produces better outcomes in the presence of party 
integration. That said, they are not interested in democratic decentralization (i.e. elections) as we 
are here, and their paper is entirely empirical, with no formal component. 
Building on all of this prior work, we demonstrate in this paper that the decentralization 
theorem, which lies at the heart of the fiscal federalism literature, is dependent on the structure of 
political institutions. Local elections and certain forms of party institutions, we argue, must be in 
place before decentralization can deliver on its promises.  
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Brief Introductory Tour to the Theory 
As noted above, the main goal of this paper is to create a rigorous and formal extension 
of Oates’ influential “decentralization theorem.” Of particular interest for us is the interaction 
between democratic (de)centralization and party (non)integration in the provision of local public 
goods.   Under democratic decentralization, local public goods are provided by democratically 
elected local governments, while under democratic centralization they are provided by the 
national government.  
Our notion of what constitutes an integrated party is the same regardless of the electoral 
system used in a country. For us, a party is integrated when power over local party officials 
flows upwards through party institutions to leaders at the national level. This concept, more fully 
defined in Hankla et al. (2019), encompasses a number of characteristics.5 For example, 
integrated parties are governed by strong institutions rather than personalist leaders, and they are 
present at all tiers of the polity. For modeling simplicity, however, we focus on what is perhaps 
the most salient feature of an integrated party—that its national leaders control access to the 
party name in local elections. When local politicians can run for office using the name of a party 
without the permission and oversight of party leaders in the capital, the party cannot be 
considered integrated. 
For space reasons, we focus our formal analysis in this paper on majoritarian, single-
member-jurisdiction systems, defining non-integrated parties as those that hold blanket or closed 
primaries (modeled separately) to choose candidates, as opposed to those having national party 
                                               
5 The models presented here build on those in Hankla et al. (2019), but here we introduce significant improvements 
including the nature of local public goods not being homogeneous and the analysis of majoritarian electoral systems 
with blanket and closed primary elections. 
 
8 
leaders nominate them.6 While we understand that many non-integrated parties practice free 
candidate nomination procedures (i.e., by collecting signatures or paying a fee) rather than 
primaries, we believe these decentralized structures will have many of the same effects as 
primaries (see Carey and Shugart 1995).  
In the majoritarian system models that are our focus here, we find that both the 
conventional decentralization theorem (which assumes away spillovers) and our new strong 
decentralization theorem (which allows for spillovers) hold—under democratic 
decentralization—when parties are integrated. In other words, we find that, when integrated 
national parties are active in local politics, locally elected governments will outperform central 
governments in providing public goods. This pattern will hold even in the presence of inter-
jurisdictional spillovers.  
In such situations, democratic decentralization creates local governments that are 
accountable to their voters’ preferences, while the vertical responsibility within integrated parties 
incentivizes these local governments to finance the efficient provision of local goods and 
services, even those with benefits that spill across jurisdictions. This is the key implication of our 
strong decentralization theorem.  
The situation is different when parties are non-integrated. In this case, it is necessary to 
consider the structure of primary elections in order to predict varying incentives for the provision 
of public goods and to determine whether democratic decentralization dominates centralization. 
For instance, we find that, under blanket primaries, our strong theorem is not satisfied but the 
                                               
6 See Hankla et al. (2019) for a previous analysis of systems using proportional representation, and Ponce et al. 
(2018) for an empirical test of our arguments. Note also that the model assumes that parties possess meaningful 
organizational structures and are not purely dominated by personalist “bosses.” It also assumes competitive elections 
at the local level. 
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conventional decentralization theorem is. Primary elections do not create the necessary 
incentives for local leaders to internalize spillovers, which mean that the strong decentralization 
theorem does not generally hold for democracies with nonintegrated parties. However, systems 
with blanket primaries are an exception. Here, local public goods with no spillovers are Pareto 
efficient and the benefits of policy differentiation are captured. By contrast, while central 
governments also provide Pareto efficient local public goods, they are not able to maximize the 
gains associated with the heterogeneity of preferences. 
  By contrast, when parties are non-integrated and primaries are closed, neither the strong 
nor the conventional decentralization theorem holds. For countries with such nominating 
institutions, parties operating under both democratically centralized and decentralized structures 
will lack incentives to provide the efficient level of local public goods. This is because the 
participation rules of closed primaries allocate voting rights only to members of a specific party 
rather than to the electorate in general. For this reason, parties operating under both structures of 
government have political incentives to target goods only to those voters who count. This 
intuition suggests why local public goods provision might not be efficient and might not 
successfully maximize the gains expected from matching policy with the heterogeneous 
preferences of voters.  
These findings have significant implications for the scholarly understanding of 
decentralization among both political scientists and economists. Most obviously, they show that 
political institutions mediate the effects of the decentralized provision of public goods to an 
extent not previously realized. In addition, our findings contribute to the theory of fiscal 
federalism and help make sense of the mixed results that characterize the empirical scholarship 
on the actual impact of decentralization on service delivery, economic growth and other 
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dimensions (see, for example, Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2016). Additionally, for development 
practitioners, they have the potential to encourage a deeper examination of the types of political 
institutions that may be necessary for decentralization reforms to produce fuller positive results. 
The Benchmark and Definitions 
We begin by characterizing the set of local public goods that maximize society’s surplus 
from public goods. This approach to benchmarking our results allows us to compare them to 
those in the normative analysis of Oates (1972) and the more recent political economy analyses 
of Besley and Coate (2003) and Lockwood (2015).  
Consider an economy composed of jurisdictions 𝑖 = {1,2} with a corresponding 
population of 𝑛𝑖 in each jurisdiction. Moreover, we assume 𝑛1 ≠ 𝑛2. Following most of the 
literature and for simplicity of the analysis, in our economy individuals do not have mobility 
across jurisdictions. The utility of an individual ℎ in jurisdiction 1 is 𝜐ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔1, 𝑔2) =
𝛼ℎ1[𝑙𝑛(𝑔1) + 𝑘2𝑙𝑛(𝑔2)]where 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 are public goods provided by jurisdictions 1 and 2 and 
𝛼ℎ1 > 0 is a parameter of intensity of preferences for public goods consumed by a resident ℎ of 
jurisdiction 1. The parameter 𝑘2 ∈ [0,1], measures the extent of inter-regional spillovers of 𝑔2 
over residents of jurisdiction 1. For local public goods without spillovers 𝑘2 = 0 , and when 
jurisdiction 2 provides a nationwide pure public good, 𝑘2 = 1. A similar expression is given by 
an individual h living in jurisdiction 2 such that 𝜐ℎ2(𝛼ℎ2, 𝑔2, 𝑔1) = 𝛼ℎ2[𝑙𝑛(𝑔2) + 𝑘1𝑙𝑛(𝑔1)]. In 
this economy, preferences are heterogeneous within and across districts. Hence, for individuals ℎ 
and ℎ′: ℎ ≠ ℎ′, 𝛼ℎ1 ≠ 𝛼ℎ′1 ≠ 𝛼ℎ2 ≠ 𝛼ℎ′2. In our model, the size of spillovers between 
jurisdictions is asymmetric therefore 𝑘1 ≠ 𝑘2. The marginal cost of producing a public good in 
all jurisdictions is 𝑞. The nationwide net social welfare for this economy is given by 𝑁𝑆:  
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𝑁𝑆𝑊 =∑ 𝜐ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔1, 𝑔2)
𝑛1
ℎ=1
+∑ 𝜐ℎ2(𝛼ℎ2, 𝑔2, 𝑔1)
𝑛2
ℎ=1
− 𝑞(𝑔1 + 𝑔2) (1) 
Proposition 1 characterizes a set of local public goods that are Pareto efficient and maximize the 
gains attributed to matching the size of local public spending to the heterogeneous preferences of 
individuals across jurisdictions.  
Proposition 1. The Pareto efficient local public goods ?̂?∗ = [?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2
∗ ] that maximize the gains 
from inter-regional policy differentiation are given by: 
[?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2






 ] (2) 
Where 𝛼1 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ1
𝑛1
ℎ=1  is the aggregate intensity of preferences for local public goods of all 
residents in district 1 and 𝛼2 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ2
𝑛2
ℎ=1  is the corresponding aggregate intensity of preferences 




























∗ − 𝑞 = 0 re-
arrange terms to obtain the result in (2). 
 In (2), local public goods with and without spillovers in each jurisdiction, ?̂?𝑖
∗ for 𝑖 = 1,2, 
are provided at the point in which the nationwide marginal social benefits of ?̂?𝑖
∗ in both 
jurisdictions are equivalent to the social marginal costs, 𝑞, of producing the local public good in 
jurisdiction 𝑖, therefore, ?̂?𝑖
∗ is Pareto efficient. For instance, the nationwide marginal social 
benefits of ?̂?1





∗ , and due 









∗, depends positively on the intensity of preferences of all residents of jurisdiction 1, 
which are given by 𝛼1 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ1
𝑛1
ℎ=1 , the intensity of preferences of all residents of jurisdiction 2, 
which are given by 𝛼2 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ2
𝑛2
ℎ=1 , the extent of inter-regional spillovers (if 𝑘1 > 0), and 
negatively on the marginal cost of the public good 𝑞. The heterogeneity of preferences of 
individuals across jurisdictions implies that in general ?̂?1
∗ ≠ ?̂?2
∗. 
Party Integration in a Democratically Centralized Government  
In this section, we introduce a model of electoral competition in a democracy 
characterized by party integration (modeled as party leaders controlling the nomination of 
candidates participating in elections) and democratic centralization (modeled as voters electing 
an official to run the central government and with no local elections). We assume that if systems 
are democratically centralized then they are also fiscally centralized. Similarly, democratically 
decentralized systems, i.e., those with elected subnational governments, are also fiscally 
decentralized, with subnational officials having autonomy over spending and taxing decisions in 
their respective jurisdictions.  
In our economy, there are two parties, 𝑃 = {𝐴, 𝐵}. The parties’ problem is to aggregate 
the heterogeneous and conflicting views of voters over public spending into a policy platform 
that maximizes the parties’ probabilities of winning the election. We characterize the political 
equilibrium of this economy throughout a sequential game of complete and perfect information 
in which all actions of all players in each stage of the game are common knowledge. In the first 
stage of the game, candidates announce policies seeking their party’s nomination and party 
leaders nominate the candidate that will run in the general election. Party leaders nominate a 
candidate by selecting a candidate 𝑗 = {1,2} to the nomination set 𝑁𝑆𝑃  with 𝑃 = {𝐴, 𝐵}. In the 
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second stage, voters observe the parties’ policies and vote. In the third stage, the winning 
candidate takes all, forms the government, and implements policy. 
In the first stage, two candidates 𝑗 = {1,2} in each party seek the nomination of their 
parties. For an economy with party integration, party leaders have full command over policy 
making by nominating only those candidates who adopt the ideal policy of party leaders. In our 
economy, the two parties compete in the election to form the government in a majoritarian 
electoral system with single member jurisdictions. Under a central government, local public 
goods are provided by a single government that represents voters of all jurisdictions. The 
government finances its expenditures through a uniform tax on residents of all jurisdictions 𝜏 
satisfying the budget constraint 𝜏(𝑛1 + 𝑛2) = 𝑞(𝑔1 + 𝑔2), where 𝜏(𝑛1 + 𝑛2) is the tax revenue 
and 𝑞(𝑔1 + 𝑔2) is the nationwide spending in local public goods. We assume the central 
government provides a uniform local public good.7  
In the second stage of the game, voters observe the parties’ policies and vote. Voting is 
sincere and all individuals vote.8 Denote Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) as the net payoff received by a voter with 
preference αℎ1 in jurisdiction 1 from party A relative to that of party B where Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) =
{𝜐𝐴ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔𝐴1, 𝑔𝐴2) − 𝜏𝐴 + 𝜎𝐴ℎ1} − {𝜐𝐵ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔𝐵1, 𝑔𝐵2) − 𝜏𝐵 + 𝜎𝐵ℎ1} and where 
𝜐𝐴ℎ1(𝛼ℎ𝑖, 𝑔𝐴1, 𝑔𝐴2) is the welfare of voter when party A selects spending policies 𝑔𝐴1, 𝑔𝐴2, 
                                               
7 The assumption of uniform central provision is quite standard in the literature. It is now agreed that central 
governments may provide heterogeneous services but that the central government may also have less information 
(Cremer and Palfrey 1996) and fewer incentives. Moreover, although federations may lead to horizontal fiscal 
externalities (Wilson 1999), and citizens could benefit from a coordinated central policy, this could also lead to less 
accountability and efficiency (Seabright 1996). Related to this same issue, Tomassi and Weinschelbaum (2003) 
characterize a tradeoff between externalities and accountability in which decentralization might be preferred even if 
preferences are identical. In summary, assuming that the central government provides uniform public goods could be 
interpreted as just convenient shorthand for assuming that centralized and decentralized governments have different 
mechanisms to match local preferences and needs with policy. 
8 The assumption of sincere voting seeks to simplify the analysis and it ignores strategic voting behavior such as 
credible threats of some coalition of voters who might abstain from voting for the nominated candidate in the 
general election if the candidate changes the policy position he previously announced. 
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𝜐𝐵ℎ1(𝛼ℎ𝑖, 𝑔𝐵1, 𝑔𝐵2) is the welfare when party B selects spending policies 𝑔𝐵1, 𝑔𝐵2, and 𝜏𝐴 and 𝜏𝐵 
are taxes on residents of all jurisdictions under parties A and B. We follow McKelvey and Patty 
(2006), and Coughlin (1992) in assuming that the net payoff Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) also depends on 
stochastic factors 𝜎𝐴ℎ1 and 𝜎𝐵ℎ1. Voter type αℎ1 in jurisdiction 1 votes for party 𝐴 if 
Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) > 0, for party 𝐵 if Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) < 0, and flips a fair coin if Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) = 0. An 
equivalent interpretation is given to Ψ𝐴ℎ2(αℎ2) which is the net payoff received by a voter with 
preference αℎ2 in jurisdiction 2 from party A relative to that of party B.  
Define ℎ1 = 𝜎𝐵ℎ1 − 𝜎𝐴ℎ1 = {𝜐𝐴ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔𝐴1, 𝑔𝐴2) − 𝜏𝐴} − {𝜐𝐵ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔𝐵1, 𝑔𝐵2) − 𝜏𝐵} 
and assume ℎ1 ∈ [ ℎ1, ℎ1], then probability that a voter type αℎ1 votes for party 𝐴 in 
jurisdiction 𝑖 is 𝐹𝐴ℎ1 = ∫ 𝑓𝐴ℎ1( ℎ1)
𝜀ℎ1
𝜀ℎ1
𝑑 ℎ1, where 𝑓𝐴ℎ1( ℎ1) is a continuous probability 
distribution over ℎ1. The expected vote of party 𝐴 in jurisdiction 1 is 𝜙𝐴1 = ∑ 𝐹𝐴ℎ1( ℎ1)
𝑛1
ℎ=1  and 
the nationwide expected vote of party 𝐴 is 𝜙𝐴 = ∑ 𝜙𝐴𝑖
2
𝑖=1  and that of party B is 𝜙𝐵 = ∑ 𝜙𝐵𝑖
2
𝑖=1 . 
Define 𝜋𝐴 ∶ 𝜌𝐴 → [0,1] as a continuous cumulative distribution over the plurality of the party, 
𝜌𝐴 = 𝜙𝐴 − 𝜙𝐵, where 𝜌𝐴 ∈ [𝜌𝐴, 𝜌𝐴] and 𝜋𝐴 = ∫ 𝑤𝐴(𝜌𝐴)
𝜌𝐴
𝜌𝐴
𝑑𝜌𝐴 , where 𝑤𝐴(𝜌𝐴) is the probability 
distribution over the party’s plurality. Following our previous discussion, we define 𝜋𝐵 as the 
probability that party 𝐵 wins the election.
 
We follow the previous literature (see, for example, 
Coughlin 1992) and assume 𝜋𝐴 is strictly concave on 𝑔𝐴1, 𝑔𝐴2 and 𝜋𝐵 is strictly concave on 
𝑔𝐵1, 𝑔𝐵2 . 
In the third stage, we define 𝛀 as a non-decreasing cumulative distribution of the 
sequence, {Ψ𝐴ℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖)}∀ℎ,∀𝑖 , hence 𝛀 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏].Therefore, if there exists a majority of individuals 
voting for party A then 𝛀( ∀ αℎ𝑖:Ψ𝐴ℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) > 0) > 1 2⁄  and party 𝐴 wins the election and 
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implements its policy platform.9 Otherwise, party 𝐵 wins the election and implements its policy 
platform. 
The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of our political process is constituted by the 
policy platforms of candidates seeking nomination 𝑔𝑃𝑖
∗  for 𝑃 = {𝐴, 𝐵} and 𝑖 = {1,2}, the 
nomination choices of party leaders 𝑁𝑆𝑃 for both parties, and the individuals’ choices of the vote 
in all jurisdictions Ψ𝐴ℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖)
>
<
0 for all voters in all districts. For a formal definition of the 
equilibrium, see Definition 1 in the appendix. On what follows, the equilibrium provision of 
local public goods is characterized in Lemma 1. In our economy, parties converge in their policy 
platforms since they maximize a continuous and strictly concave probability function of winning 
the election based on a common system of beliefs and strategy policy set.10 In this section, and 
with the purpose of differentiating the outcome from this section with upcoming sections of the 
paper, we define the equilibrium policy as 𝑔𝑐
∗. Formally, our main result of this section is the 
following. 
Lemma 1. Local public goods with and without spillovers are Pareto efficient for an economy 
with a majoritarian electoral system, single member jurisdictions, a democratically centralized 













                                               
9 Note that 𝛀 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏] is a non-decreasing cumulative distribution of the sequence {Ψ𝐴ℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖)}∀ℎ,∀𝑖 , hence, given 
some policies 𝑔𝐴1, 𝑔𝐴2 of party A and policies 𝑔𝐵1, 𝑔𝐵2 of party B, if 𝛀( ∀ αℎ𝑖: Ψ𝐴ℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) > 0) = 0.3 then 30% of 
voters vote for party A and 70% for party B.  
10 For a formal proof of convergence in probabilistic voting models with homogeneous parties see Coughlin (1992). 
11 Because all candidates of all parties converge in selecting their policy platforms, in Lemma 1 we have drop the 












 ] (4) 
Proof 
See the appendix. 
Lemma 1 says 𝑔𝑐
∗ is a Pareto efficient provision of local public goods since the institution 
of democratic centralization provides voting rights to residents of all jurisdictions and parties 
have electoral incentives to take into account the marginal benefits and costs of public goods of 
all residents of all jurisdictions. As a result, parties select a policy in which the nationwide social 
marginal benefits of public goods are equal to the society’s marginal costs. In addition, since the 
central government provides a uniform public good across jurisdictions then democratic 
centralization and party integration create incentives for politicians to provide a local public 
good, 𝑔𝑐







∗ corresponds to the average of 
the socially optimal provision of public goods in jurisdiction 1 and 2, that is, ?̂?1
∗ and ?̂?2
∗. 
Party Integration and Democratic Decentralization  
In this section, we consider the case of party integration and democratic decentralization 
(i.e. local government elections with fiscal decentralization). To anticipate the results that follow 
below, this section has two main findings. First, we show that party integration in a system of 
local governments leads to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without inter-regional 
spillovers. This finding that local elections might lead to Pareto efficient local public goods with 
inter-regional spillovers is different to the findings of most political economy models in the 
literature (see for instance Besley and Coate 2003 and many others). Second, local public 
spending is differentiated to match the heterogeneous spending policies demanded by voters 
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across jurisdictions. Third, we show that, under party integration, democratic decentralization 
dominates democratic centralization.  
To prove these claims, we develop again a sequential game of complete and perfect 
information with local elections. In the first stage of the game, candidates announce policies 
seeking their party’s nomination and party leaders nominate the candidate that will run in the 
local election of jurisdictions 1 and 2. In the second stage, voters observe the parties’ policies 
and vote in the local election of their jurisdiction. In the third stage, the winning candidate in the 
local election takes all, forms the government and implements policy. 
In a federation with integrated parties, party leaders want to win multiple local elections 
and nominate candidates who propose policies that maximize the party’s joint probability of 
winning elections in jurisdictions 1 and 2.
12 In this case, party leaders have full command on 
policy making by nominating only those candidates who adopt the ideal policy of party leaders. 
Party Leaders nominate a candidate by selecting a candidate 𝑗 = 1,2 in jurisdictions 1 and 2 to 
the nomination set 𝑁𝑆𝑃 for parties 𝑃 = {𝐴,𝐵}.  
Two parties compete in the local election of each jurisdiction to form the local 
government. For the analysis that follows, we define the joint probability of party 𝐴 of winning 
local elections in jurisdictions 1 and 2 by 𝜋𝐿𝐴 = 𝜋𝐿𝐴(𝜌𝐿𝐴1, 𝜌𝐿𝐴2) where 𝜋𝐿𝐴 is a function of the 
pluralities of the party in both jurisdictions, 𝜌𝐿𝐴1 and 𝜌𝐿𝐴2, where 𝜌𝐿𝐴𝑖 = 𝜙𝐿𝐴𝑖 − 𝜙𝐿𝐵𝑖, and 
𝜙𝐿𝐴𝑖 = ∑ 𝐹𝐿𝐴ℎ𝑖( ℎ𝑖)
𝑛1
ℎ=1  is the number of votes that party 𝐴 expects to receive in the local 
election of jurisdiction 𝑖 and 𝐹𝐿𝐴ℎ𝑖( ℎ𝑖) is the marginal probability that a voter type 𝛼ℎ
𝑖  votes for 
                                               
12 In the previous section, under democratic centralization, parties design spending policies to maximize the parties’ 
probability of winning a single national election in which voters from all jurisdictions vote. In this section, under 
democratic decentralization, parties with nationwide presence, design policies to maximize the joint probability of 
winning all local elections.  
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party 𝐴 in the local election of jurisdiction 𝑖 (a similar interpretation is given to 𝜙𝐿𝐵𝑖). A similar 
expression is given for the probability of party B of winning the local election 𝜋𝐿𝐵. We assume 
that 𝜋𝐿𝐴 and 𝜋𝐿𝐵 are continuous and strictly concave function of public goods in jurisdictions 1 
and 2. 
In the second stage of the game, voters observe the parties’ policies and vote. All 
individuals vote and voting is sincere. For the case 𝑖 = 1, we define Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) as the net payoff 
received by a voter with preference αℎ1 in jurisdiction 1 from party A relative to that of party B 
where Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) = {𝜐𝐴ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔𝐴1, 𝑔𝐴2) − 𝜏𝐴1 + 𝜎𝐴ℎ1} − {𝜐𝐵ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔𝐵1, 𝑔𝐵2) − 𝜏𝐵𝑖 + 𝜎𝐵ℎ1}.
13 
In a system of local governments, politicians pay for local public goods by setting a head tax on 
residents of their respective jurisdiction 𝑖 = {1,2} with 𝜏𝐴𝑖 =
𝑞𝑔𝐴𝑖
𝑛𝑖
. In addition, the net payoff 
Ψ𝐴ℎ1 also depends on stochastic factors determined by 𝜎𝐴ℎ1 and 𝜎𝐵ℎ1. Voter type αℎ1 votes for 
party 𝐴 in the local election of jurisdiction 𝑖 if Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) > 0; if Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) < 0 he or she votes 
for party 𝐵, and the voter flips a fair coin if Ψ𝐴ℎ1(αℎ1) = 0. 
In the third stage, in the local election of jurisdiction 𝑖, if there exists a majority of 
individuals voting for party 𝐴 then 𝛀𝒊( ∀ αℎ𝑖:Ψ𝐴ℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) > 0) > 1 2⁄  then party 𝐴 wins the 
election and 𝑔𝐿𝐴𝑖
∗  is implemented, otherwise party 𝐵 wins and 𝑔𝐿𝐵𝑖
∗  is implemented. 
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the political process with local elections is 
constituted by policy platforms of candidates 𝐽 = {1,2} seeking nomination from their parties in 
their respective jurisdictions, the nomination choices of party leaders 𝑁𝑆𝐿𝑃𝑖  ∀𝑃, ∀𝑖, that is to say, 
party leaders nominate a candidate that will run with the party label in each local election, and 
                                               
13 Notice that from the perspective of politicians in jurisdiction 1, the welfare of the voter associated with local 
spending is 𝜐𝐴ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔𝐴1, 𝑔𝐴2) and 𝑔𝐴1 is a choice variable but 𝑔𝐴2 is exogenous and determined by the policy 
maker of jurisdiction 2.  
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the individuals’ choices of the vote in their respective local election. For a formal 
characterization of this equilibrium, see Definition 2 in the appendix. In this economy, all 
candidates of all parties converge in their policy platforms since they maximize a continuous and 
strictly concave probability function of winning multiple elections based on a common system of 
beliefs and strategy policy set. Lemma 2 characterizes the equilibrium spending policies for this 
economy and Theorem 1 shows that if parties are integrated then democratic decentralization 
dominates democratic centralization. 
Lemma 2. Party integration and democratic decentralization lead to a set of Pareto efficient local 
public goods with and without spillovers, 𝐠𝐋
∗ = [𝑔𝐿1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿2
∗ ]. At the equilibrium, 𝑔𝐿1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿2










 ] (5) 
Proof 
See the appendix. 
Lemma 2 says that parties have electoral incentives to choose a policy that maximizes the 
joint probability of winning all local elections. Lemma 2 shows that this policy is equivalent to 
choosing a policy that maximizes an anonymous utilitarian nationwide social welfare function 
subject to the constraint that the local public good of the jurisdiction is financed by the residents 
of the jurisdiction. To see this, note the equivalence between the results in expressions (2) and 
(5) implying 𝑔𝐿𝑖
∗ = ?̂?𝑖
∗ ∀𝑖. In (5), parties have electoral incentives to provide local public goods 
with and without spillovers at the point in which the nationwide marginal social gains, 
constituted by the sum of the marginal utility gains of all voters in jurisdiction 𝑖 plus the 




∗ ), are equal to the nationwide social marginal costs of the public good. At 
𝑔𝐿𝑖
∗ > 0 ∀𝑖, the nationwide aggregate surplus from local public goods is maximized. The 
heterogeneity of preferences of individuals across jurisdictions implies that 𝑔𝐿1
∗ ≠ 𝑔𝐿2
∗ . 
The decentralized provision of local public goods with and without spillovers is Pareto 
efficient because the political process is centralized and national parties seek to win elections in 
all jurisdictions and recognize that the inter-regional externalities of local public goods create an 
interdependence between the parties’ expected votes in the elections of jurisdictions 1 and 2. 
Thus, parties have electoral incentives to coordinate local policies and propose spending policies 
that internalize the inter-regional spillovers in order to maximize the party’s joint probability of 
winning the elections in all jurisdictions. In addition, if parties are integrated, local governments 
maximize the gains from differentiating local public goods according to the heterogeneous 
preferences of voters across jurisdictions. 












 1 ,  2,   1 = 𝛼1 + 𝑘1𝛼2 2 = 𝛼2 + 𝑘2𝛼1
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To contrast the outcomes between democratic centralization and decentralization with 
party integration, in Figure 1, we show the allocation under democratic decentralization given by 
𝑔𝐿1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿2
∗  and 𝑔𝑐
∗ which is the equilibrium policy under democratic centralization. In Figure 1,   is 
the party’s electoral costs of public goods, and  1 and  2 represent the party’s electoral gains 
from the provision of public goods in jurisdictions 1 and 2 in economies with party integration 
and democratic decentralization. The expected votes in jurisdiction 1,  1, is equivalent to the 
marginal utility gains of all voters in jurisdiction 1 plus the marginal utility gains of all voters of 
jurisdiction 2. A similar interpretation is given to  2, and without loss of generality, we assume 




represents the parties’ nationwide expected proportion of votes in a nationwide election from 
policy platform 𝑔𝑐
∗, which, is also equivalent to the average nationwide marginal utility gains of 
providing 𝑔𝑐
∗.  
Figure 1 shows the loss of welfare associated with a move from democratic 
decentralization to centralization under party integration. A move from 𝑔𝐿2
∗  to 𝑔𝑐
∗ implies that, 
from the perspective of residents of jurisdiction 2, public spending is too high which leads to a 
loss of welfare for residents of that jurisdiction. Similarly, a move from 𝑔𝐿1
∗  to 𝑔𝑐
∗ implies that, 
from the perspective of residents of jurisdiction 1, public spending is too low which also leads to 
a loss of welfare for residents of that jurisdiction. More formally, in Theorem 1, our strong 
Decentralization Theorem shows that democratic decentralization welfare dominates 




Theorem 1. “Strong Decentralization Theorem.” If parties are integrated, then the provision of 
local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers by a system of democratically elected 
local governments welfare-dominates the democratically centralized provision.  
Proof 
See the appendix. 
Theorem 1 says that the nationwide welfare of voters is maximized when local public 
goods with and without inter-regional spillovers are provided by a system of local governments. 
This outcome is a stronger version of the decentralization theorem proposed by Oates (1972), 
since democratic decentralization dominates democratic centralization even if local public goods 
show inter-regional spillovers.  
Note, first, that local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers are Pareto 
efficient under both a central government and a system of local governments. Second, by 
matching the individuals’ demand for heterogeneous public spending across jurisdictions, the 
decentralized provision maximizes the gains associated with inter-regional policy differentiation. 
Since the central government does not maximize the gains from differentiating local public 
goods to match local preferences, democratic decentralization is welfare superior to democratic 
centralization.  
For reasons of space and mathematical simplicity, we have assumed that the central 
government is constrained to provide uniform local public goods. However, in Hankla et al 
(2019), we relax this assumption and identify conditions to show that our analysis is robust. 
Decentralization dominates centralization even when the central government can differentiate 




We turn our analysis to the provision of local public goods in a democracy with a 
majoritarian electoral system, single member jurisdictions, and non-integrated parties. In contrast 
to the case of integrated parties in which the decision to nominate candidates can rely on a small 
group of politicians (or even a single politician) inside a party, the nomination process in the case 
of non-integrated parties is determined by a primary election in which residents first vote to 
nominate a candidate while later in the general election voters elect a public official. In this 
setting, we study how the political institutions of primaries create incentives for parties to 
represent into policy platforms either the interests of a broad set of voters in the electorate or else 
the preferences of a minority coalition of voters. 
Proponents of non-integrated parties argue that primary elections promote the political 
participation of voters and the representation of their interests in the policies eventually 
implemented by the government. However, the participation rules of primaries might actually 
limit both the voters’ participation in elections and their effective political influence on policy 
design. Primary elections can be blanket, open and closed (see Kaufman, Gimpel and Hoffman 
2003). In blanket primaries, voters of any affiliation may vote in the primary and voters are given 
a ballot listing all candidates of all parties (see Keefe 1998). In contrast, in closed primaries only 
those voters affiliated with a party (probably partisan voters) can vote in the party’s primary. 
Blanket primaries provide the whole electorate with the opportunity to nominate 
candidates and parties have incentives to consider the whole distribution of voters’ views while 
designing policy. However, in closed primaries candidates have electoral incentives to weigh 
(discount) heavily the preferences over policy of those voters who can (not) participate in the 
primary election. Hence, parties might have electoral incentives to implement the ideal policy of 
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primary voters. This might be considered socially undesirable because, in this case, public 
spending does not maximize the society’s net fiscal incidence associated with public goods but 
the net surplus from public goods for a minority coalition of voters (the primary voters).14  
The main results of this section are: first, the strong decentralization theorem does not 
hold for economies with non-integrated parties. We also find that the specific institutions of 
primaries might (not) lead to the expected benefits of democratic decentralization. In particular, 
Oates’ conventional decentralization theorem (which assumes no spillovers) holds only for 
economies with blanket primaries. If primaries are closed then the decentralization theorem, in 
general, does not hold. Local leaders will be too beholden to their co-partisans rather than to the 
overall interests of their constituents. These are important and novel results. In summary, in this 
section we clearly show that the political institutions of non-integrated parties may also matter 
considerably in determining the gains from decentralization. 
Non-Integrated Parties and Democratic Centralization  
In this section we analyze a model with non-integrated parties (an economy in which 
nominations are determined through a primary election) and democratic centralization (voters 
elect public officials only for the central government). Corresponding to the latter, the economy 
is also fiscally centralized. That is, local public goods are provided and taxes levied by a single 
government that represents voters of all jurisdictions. The government finances its expenditures 
through a tax on residents of all jurisdictions.  
                                               
14 The net fiscal incidence or fiscal surplus of local public goods reflects the following tradeoff: on the one hand, an 
increase of public spending leads to higher utility for voters (this is the marginal social benefit). On the other hand, 
higher spending requires higher taxes and lower consumption of private goods (this is the marginal social cost), see 
Martinez-Vazquez (1982).  
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We consider a sequential game of complete and perfect information with a primary and a 
general election to form the central government. In the first stage, two individuals, denoted by 
𝑗 = {1,2} in each party seek the nomination of their party by declaring their binding policy 
platforms over public spending. In the second stage, all voters observe the candidates’ policies 
but only qualified voters vote in the primary election.15 In our economy, under a closed primary 
the right to vote is limited only to voters affiliated with the party. In contrast, in blanket 
primaries voters are given a ballot listing all candidates of all parties (see Keefe 1998) and voters 
vote in the primary of each party.  
To model the right to vote in primary elections, and for simplicity of the analysis, we 
assume Nature moves and selects a set of voters who can participate in the primary. Hence, in 
each jurisdiction, Nature selects the distribution of qualified voters to participate in the primary 
of party 𝑃.16 The distribution of qualified voters selected by Nature is given by 
{𝛼𝑃1𝑖 , 𝛼𝑃2𝑖  …… . . 𝛼𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑖} where 𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖 identifies a voter with some preference for public goods, 
the subscript 𝑃 shows the label of the party of the primary in which the voter will be 
participating and qualified voters are indexed by ℎ = 1,2… .𝑚𝑖 where 𝑚𝑖 is the number of voters 
participating in the primary election of jurisdiction 𝑖.17 In a blanket primary, all voters are given 
a ballot listing all candidates of all parties (see Keefe 1998) and voters vote in the primary of 
                                               
15 The assumption that, in the first stage candidates announce a binding policy platform is for simplicity of the 
analysis and it ignores dynamic inconsistency issues such as the possibility that candidates might announce different 
policies in the primary and general elections to please, respectively, primary and general election voters. 
16 In our model, the move by Nature could be interpreted as a move by an exogenous player with no strategic 
interest in the outcome of the game.  
17 In the real world, the number of primary voters participating in the closed primary of each party will be different. 
Here, however, we assume that 𝑚𝑖 voters participate in the primary of each party. This assumption helps to simplify 
our models and, at the same time, it does not change the main results of our analysis. 
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each party, therefore 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 where 𝑛𝑖 is the number of residents of jurisdiction 𝑖. In a closed 
primary, only 𝑚𝑖 < 𝑛𝑖 qualified voters participate in the primary of one party.  
In the third stage of the game, the candidate who receives the majority of votes across all 
jurisdictions wins the primary and obtains the nomination of his or her party. In the fourth stage, 
the general election takes place and all voters in the electorate vote from the set of nominated 
candidates to elect a public official. Voting is sincere at the different stages of the electoral 
contest. In the fifth stage, votes are counted and the party with a majority of votes wins the 
general election, forms the government and implements its proposal on public spending. 
In the first stage of the game, candidates 𝑗 = {1,2} of party 𝑃 = {𝐴,𝐵} announce 
spending platforms to maximize, Φ𝑗𝑃, which is the candidates’ joint probability of winning the 
nationwide primary and general elections. We assume Φ𝑗𝑃 is continuous and strictly concave on 
spending on public goods. Hence, candidates of, let’s say party A, propose a policy platform that 
is sequentially rational and, therefore, their policy platform must consider two different states 
that might be played next: candidates might compete in the general election against candidate 1 
or 2 of party 𝐵. 







𝑑𝜌𝑗𝑃0𝑑𝜌𝑗𝑃1𝑑𝜌𝑗𝑃2 as the joint 
cumulative probability that candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 wins the primary and general elections where 
𝑤𝑗𝑃 = 𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃 𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃0𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃1𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃2⁄ > 0 is the joint probability distribution function and 𝜌𝑗𝑃0 is the 
nationwide plurality in the primary election of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 versus that of the other 
candidate running in the primary and 𝜌𝑗𝑃1 is the nationwide plurality in the general election for 
the state in which candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 runs against candidate 1 of the competing party. A 
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similar interpretation is given to 𝜌𝑗𝑃2. In each case, the pluralities 𝜌𝑗𝑃𝑠  are defined in the interval 
𝜌𝑗𝑃𝑠 ∈ [𝜌𝑠, 𝜌𝑠] for 𝑠 = {0,1,2}.
18,19 
For the case of party 𝑃 = 𝐴, each of the nationwide pluralities are given by the difference 
of the expected votes between party A, 𝜙𝑗𝐴𝑠, and party B, 𝜙𝑗𝐵𝑠 , that is, 𝜌𝑗𝐴𝑠 = 𝜙𝑗𝐴𝑠 −𝜙𝑗𝐵𝑠  for 
the states 𝑠 = {01,2} and the nationwide sum of expected votes in the primary (for the case 𝑠 =
0) is 𝜙𝑗𝐴0 +𝜙𝑗𝐵0 = 𝑚1 +𝑚2 and in the general election is 𝜙𝑗𝐴𝑠 +𝜙𝑗𝐵𝑠 = 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 for 𝑠 = 1,2. 
The expected votes of candidate 𝑗 of party A in the nationwide primary election is 𝜙𝑗𝐴0 =
∑ 𝜙𝑗𝐴0𝑖
2
𝑖=1 , and 𝜙𝑗𝐴1 = ∑ 𝜙𝑗𝐴1𝑖
2
𝑖=1  is the expected votes of candidate j of party A in the general 
election in the event this candidate faces candidate 1 of party 𝐵 and 𝜙𝑗𝐴2 = ∑ 𝜙𝑗𝐴12
2
𝑖=1  is the 
corresponding nationwide expected vote of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝐴 when this candidate faces 
candidate 2 of party 𝐵. 
The expected vote of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝐴 in the primary of jurisdiction 𝑖 is 𝜙𝑗𝐴0𝑖 =
∑ 𝐹𝑗𝐴0𝑖( 𝑗𝐴0𝑖)
𝑚𝑖
ℎ=1  ∀𝑖, where 𝐹𝑗𝐴0𝑖( 𝐽𝐴0𝑖) = 𝜕
2𝐹𝑗𝐴𝑖(Ψ𝑗𝐴0𝑖 , Ψ𝑗𝐴1𝑖 , Ψ𝑗𝐴2𝑖) 𝜕Ψ𝑗𝐴1𝑖⁄ 𝜕Ψ𝑗𝐴2𝑖  is the 
continuous marginal probability that a voter type α𝐴ℎ𝑖 in jurisdiction i votes for candidate 𝑗 of 
party 𝐴 in the primary, and 𝐹𝑗𝐴𝑖 = 𝐹𝑗𝐴𝑖(Ψ𝑗𝐴0𝑖 , Ψ𝑗𝐴1𝑖 , Ψ𝑗𝐴2𝑖) is the joint probability that the voter 
type α𝐴ℎ𝑖 votes for candidate 𝑗 of party 𝐴 in the primary and the general election. Similarly, the 
sum of expected votes for candidate 𝑗 of party 𝐴 in the general election from jurisdiction 𝑖 is 
𝜙𝑗𝐴𝑠𝑖 = ∑ 𝐹𝑗𝐴𝑠𝑖( 𝐽𝐴𝑠𝑖)
𝑛𝑖
ℎ=1  ∀𝑖 
for 𝑠 = {1,2} where 𝐹𝑗𝐴𝑠𝑖  is the corresponding marginal probability 
                                               
18 Note that 𝜌𝑗𝑃𝑠 is the plurality of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in state 𝑠 = {0,1,2}. When 𝑠 = 0 then candidate 𝑗 is 
competing in the primary election. In the event that candidate 𝑗 obtains the nomination then this candidate must 
consider two different states that might be played in the general election: candidates might compete against 
candidate 𝑠 = 1 or 𝑠 = 2 of the opposite party. 






that a voter type αℎ𝑖 in jurisdiction i votes for 𝑗 of party 𝐴 if he or she faces candidates 𝑠 = 1 or 
𝑠 = 2 of party 𝐵 in the general election.
20 
The joint probability that a voter with preference α𝐴ℎ𝑖 in jurisdiction 𝑖 votes for candidate 
𝑗 of party 𝐴 in the primary and the general election is 𝐹𝑗𝐴𝑖(Ψ𝑗𝐴0𝑖 , Ψ𝑗𝐴1𝑖 , Ψ𝑗𝐴2𝑖), which is assumed 
to be continuous and non-decreasing with Ψ𝑗𝐴0𝑖 , Ψ𝑗𝐴1𝑖 , and Ψ𝑗𝐴2𝑖. Recall Ψ𝑗𝐴0𝑖  is the individual’s 
net payoff for voter with preference αℎ𝑖 in jurisdiction 𝑖 from voting for candidate 𝑗 of party A 
instead of the competing candidate of the same party in the primary, and Ψ𝑗𝐴1𝑖  and Ψ𝑗𝐴2𝑖  are the 
net payoffs of voting for candidate 𝑗 of party 𝐴 instead of candidates 1 or 2 of party 𝐵 in the 
general election. If Ψ𝑗𝐴0𝑖 > 0,Ψ𝑗𝐴1𝑖 > 0,Ψ𝑗𝐴2𝑖 > 0, a voter type α𝐴ℎ𝑖 in jurisdiction i votes for 
candidate 𝑗 of party 𝐴 in the nationwide primary and general elections.  
We characterize the electoral equilibrium for this economy in Definition 3 (see the 
appendix) and the equilibrium level for public goods (the main result of this section) in Lemma 
3. Candidates facing sequential primary and general election face several tradeoffs: The first 
tradeoff is between the ideal policies of primary voters versus the socially optimal policies in 
each jurisdiction.21 Since candidates have incentives to choose a policy that maximizes their joint 
probability of winning the primary and general election, candidates need to choose a policy that 
reflects a compromise between the ideal policies of primary voters and a linear combination of 
the policies that maximize the nationwide welfare. If the ideal policies of primary voters are not 
middle of the road policies, and primary voters have a significant electoral weight, then 
                                               
20 Our notation means that a voter type α𝐴ℎ𝑖 has the right to vote in the primary of party A in the second stage of the 
game while the same voter, now characterized by αℎ𝑖 has the right to participate in the general election (which is not 
conditioned to the election organized by a certain party) that takes place in the fourth stage of the game. 
21 A nationwide general election gives voting rights to residents of all jurisdictions. For this reason, in our economy, 
the ideal policies of general election voters are equivalent to the socially optimal policies.  
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candidates might have incentives to design polarized policies with too much or too little 
government spending. 
The second tradeoff that candidates also need to take into account is the distribution of 
votes in each jurisdiction. Hence, there is a tradeoff between the ideal policy of voters of 
jurisdiction 1 versus the policy of voters of jurisdiction 2. This particular tradeoff might also 
create incentives for politicians to focalize local public goods and concentrate a significant 
amount of resources in jurisdictions that have significant electoral influence. If local public 
goods are focalized in some jurisdiction then the scope of net benefits of public goods might be 
greatly diminished (that is, local public goods might not be designed to benefit a broad portion of 
voters but to benefit a minoritarian coalition of voters). 
For the analysis that follows, we define the following concepts: Let 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  be the 
equilibrium policy of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 under non-integrated parties and democratic 
centralization. We also denote 𝐺𝑃01
∗  and 𝐺𝑃02
∗  as the ideal policies of voters participating in the 
nationwide primary election of party 𝑃 in jurisdictions 1 and 2 and 𝑊𝑗𝑃01 and 𝑊𝑗𝑃02 are the 
weights, or relative electoral importance, that candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 assigns to the corresponding 
ideal policies of voters participating in the nationwide primary election in jurisdictions 1 and 2. 
For the analysis that follows 𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃0𝑖  𝑖 = 1,2 where 𝛽𝑗𝑃0𝑖  is the change in the nationwide 




∗ are the socially optimal policies in jurisdictions 1 and 2 and 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 
and 𝑊𝑗𝑃2 are the weights that candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 assigns to the socially optimal policies in 
jurisdictions 1 and 2 (or equivalently the ideal policies of general election voters). For the 
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analysis that follows 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 and 𝑊𝑗𝑃2 are the change in the nationwide plurality of votes that 
candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 expects to receive in the general election from jurisdictions 1 and 2, 
respectively. Recall that in the nationwide general election, candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 runs against 
candidates 1 or 2 of the competing party. Hence the weight 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃11 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃21 reflects the 
sum of 𝛽𝑗𝑃11 which is the expected plurality of votes from jurisdiction 1 when candidate 𝑗 of 
party 𝑃 runs against candidate 1 of the competing party and 𝛽𝑗𝑃21 which is the plurality of 
expected votes from jurisdiction 1 when this candidate runs against candidate 2 of the competing 
party. A similar interpretation is given to 𝑊𝑗𝑃2 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃12 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃22 for the expected plurality of 
votes in the general election from jurisdiction 2. In what follows, Lemma 3 shows the 
equilibrium policy 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ : 
Lemma 3. For economies with non-integrated parties and democratic centralization, a candidate 
j of party P proposes a uniform and Pareto efficient local public good 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  in jurisdictions 1 and 
2 satisfying the following: 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ = Υ𝑗𝑃𝑐  (𝑊𝑗𝑃01𝐺𝑃01
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃02𝐺𝑃02
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃1  ?̂?1
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃2  ?̂?2
∗) (6) 
Where Υ𝑗𝑃𝑐  is a proportionality parameter given by: 
Υ𝑗𝑃𝑐 =
1








 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐 =
𝑛1 + 𝑛2





Moreover, 𝐶𝑜𝑣0 is a weighted covariance of the marginal probability of the vote of candidate j 






 which is the change in welfare of each 
individual voter due in jurisdiction i to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . In addition, 
𝜕𝛷𝑗𝑃
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃0
 is the 














And 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃0𝑖 is the covariance of the marginal probability of voters in jurisdiction i for candidate 
j of party 𝑃 in the primary and the change in welfare of each resident of jurisdiction i due to a 
marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ .  
Moreover, 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸 is a weighted covariance of the marginal probability of the vote of candidate j 






 which is the change in the welfare of each 
resident in jurisdiction i due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . Moreover, 
𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃𝑠
 is the candidate’s 

















And 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑖 is the covariance of the marginal probability of voters in jurisdiction i for candidate 
j of party 𝑃 in the general election and the change in welfare of each resident of jurisdiction i 
due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐






Lemma 3 says that 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  is proportional to a linear combination of the ideal policies of all 
voters participating in the primary election of party 𝑃 in jurisdictions 1 and 2 determined by 
𝑊𝑗𝑃01𝐺𝑃01
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃02𝐺𝑃02
∗  and a linear combination of the socially optimal policies in jurisdictions 
1 and 2 determined by 𝑊𝑗𝑃1  ?̂?1
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃2 ?̂?2
∗.22 The parameters 𝑊𝑗𝑃01 > 0,𝑊𝑗𝑃02 > 0 represent the 
relative electoral influence of primary voters in jurisdictions 1 and 2. The higher 𝑊𝑗𝑃01, the 
higher is the change in the expected number of votes that candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 expects to 
receive from residents of jurisdiction 1 in the primary election and candidates have electoral 
incentives to choose a policy closer to the ideal policy of residents of jurisdiction 1 who 
participate in the primary election. A similar interpretation is given to the weights of electoral 
influence of voters in the general election in jurisdictions 1 and 2 given by 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 > 0,𝑊𝑗𝑃2 > 0.  
Moreover, it is relevant to point out that the relative plurality gain between the primary 
and general election is determined by the relative values of 𝑊𝑗𝑃01, 𝑊𝑗𝑃02 vis-à-vis 
𝑊𝑗𝑃1  ,𝑊𝑗𝑃2  .For instance if 𝑊𝑗𝑃01 +𝑊𝑗𝑃02 > 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 +𝑊𝑗𝑃2 then primary voters in jurisdictions 1 
and 2 have a higher electoral weight than general election voters in jurisdictions 1 and 2. The 
higher the difference the higher is the electoral incentive for candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 to propose 
the ideal policy of the average nationwide primary voter. Another example is that in the case in 
which 𝑊𝑗𝑃01 > 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 then primary voters in jurisdiction 1 have a higher electoral weight than 
general election voters in jurisdiction 1. In this case, parties’ weigh more heavily the preferences 
of primary voters in jurisdiction 1 versus general election voters of jurisdiction 1 and the higher 
                                               
22 Recall that the institution of democratic centralization induces parties to take into account the marginal benefits 
and costs of public goods of all residents of all jurisdictions, which explains why parties have electoral incentives to 
consider a linear combination of the socially optimal policies 𝑔1
∗, 𝑔2





is the electoral incentive for candidates to focalize local public spending and propose the ideal 
policy of the average primary voter of jurisdiction 1. 
The equilibrium level of 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐






 which depends on the cost of producing public goods 𝑞 and the 
parameters Θ𝑗𝑃𝑐 and Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐 that explain how the distribution of electoral costs associated with the 
tax burden are aggregated through the political process. That is to say, the parameters Θ𝑗𝑃𝑐 and 
Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐 show the distribution of burden of costs of producing public goods among primary and 
general election voters in jurisdictions 1 and 2. In particular, the higher is Θ𝑗𝑃𝑐 the higher is the 
electoral cost associated with the burden of financing public goods for primary voters in 
jurisdictions 1 and 2. Similarly, the higher is Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐 the higher is the burden of costs of local public 
goods for general election voters in jurisdictions 1 and 2. In both cases, increases in Θ𝑗𝑃𝑐 and Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐 
lead to a lower provision of 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . 
In addition, 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸 is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting 
for candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 from individual type αℎ𝑖 in jurisdiction 𝑖 in the general election and the 
change in the well-being of each voter from an increase in the provision of the local public good. 
Candidates will have electoral incentives to increase the size of 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  when 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸 is positive; that 
is, when the electorate is constituted by voters who simultaneously have higher than average 
marginal probabilities of voting for candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 and higher than average demands for 
local public goods. A similar interpretation is given to 𝐶𝑜𝑣0 which is a weighted covariance 
between the marginal probability of voting for candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 from individual type α𝑃ℎ𝑖 
in jurisdiction 𝑖 in the primary election of party 𝑃 and the change in wellbeing of the voter from 
an increase in the provision of the local public good.  
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It is relevant to point out that positive and negative values of 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸 and 𝐶𝑜𝑣0 tend to 
move the design of public spending from the center of the distribution of ideal policies of general 
and primary voters towards a policy that is polarized, and leading towards too much government 
spending if 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸 and 𝐶𝑜𝑣0 are positive, and too little government spending if 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸 and 𝐶𝑜𝑣0 
are negative. 
It should be clear from our previous discussion that different political institutions such as 
party integration and decentralization lead to different processes of aggregating the conflicting 
preferences of voters into policy platforms. For this reason, the equilibrium level of government 
spending in party integrated versus non-integrated regimes will be, in general, different. To 
provide a contrast for the results of this section, Figure 2 shows the marginal electoral benefits 
for parties from public goods in economies with party integration and democratic centralization, 
which leads to a policy given by 𝑔𝑐
∗ (see Lemma 2 and the curve given by 
𝜒1+𝜒2
2
), and the 
marginal electoral benefits when parties are non-integrated and there is democratic centralization 
(see the dashed red line), which leads to policy 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ .  




In Figure 2, the marginal electoral benefits for parties in the primary and general election 
are defined, respectively, by the marginal utility of the public good of the nationwide weighted 
average primary voter, 𝑊𝑗𝑃01𝐺𝑃01
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃02𝐺𝑃02
∗ , and the marginal utility of the nationwide 
weighted average general voter 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 ?̂?1
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃2 ?̂?2
∗. For purposes of exposition, Figure 2 shows 
the case in which the ideal policy of the weighted average voter of the general election in 
systems with non-integrated parties, 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 ?̂?1
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃2 ?̂?2
∗, is smaller than the ideal policy of the 
average voter in systems with integrated parties, 
𝜒1+𝜒2
2
, which, in turn, is also assumed to be 








∗ . Therefore, Figure 2 shows the particular case in 
which parties have incentives to select more government spending in systems with non-




Non-Integrated Parties and Democratic Decentralization  
In this section, we characterize the provision of local public goods for an economy with 
sequential primary and general elections and democratic decentralization (voters elect public 
officials at the local level). The structure of the game is easily extended from our previous 
discussion: Local public goods are chosen by the local government and expenditure is financed 
by a uniform tax on residents in each jurisdiction. To form local governments, primary and 
general elections take place in each jurisdiction.  
In the first stage, candidates 𝑗 = {1,2} of each party in jurisdiction 𝑖, announce policy 
platforms that maximize the joint probability of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 = {𝐴,𝐵} of winning the 
local primary and general elections Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖 = Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖(𝜌𝑗𝑃0𝑖 , 𝜌𝑗𝑃1𝑖 , 𝜌𝑗𝑃2𝑖) that depends on the plurality 
 
36 
of the candidate in states 𝑠 = 0,1,2 given by 𝜌𝑗𝑃0𝑖 , 𝜌𝑗𝑃1𝑖  and 𝜌𝑗𝑃2𝑖 . In the second stage, residents 
of jurisdiction 𝑖 observe the candidates’ policies but only qualified voters vote in the primary 
election. Nature selects the set of qualified voters who can participate in the primary of each 
party. In the third stage of the game, the candidate who receives the majority of votes in the 
jurisdiction wins the nomination of his or her party. In the fourth stage, the general election takes 
place and all voters of the jurisdiction vote from the set of nominated candidates to elect a public 
official. Voting is sincere at the different stages of the electoral contest. In the fifth stage, votes 
are counted and the party with a majority of votes wins the general election, forms the local 
government and implements its proposal on public spending in the jurisdiction. 
For the analysis that follows, we define the following concepts: Let 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗  be the 
equilibrium policy of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in jurisdiction 𝑖 for a democracy with non-integrated 
parties and democratic decentralization. We also denote 𝐺0𝑖
∗  and 𝐺𝑖
∗ as the ideal policies of voters 
participating, respectively, in the primary and in the general election of jurisdiction 𝑖 and 𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 
and 𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑖  are the electoral weights of primary and general election voters in jurisdiction 𝑖. For 
the analysis that follows, 𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖  is the change in the plurality of votes that candidate 𝑗 of party 
𝑃 expects to receive in the primary election, and 𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃1𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃2𝑖  is the change in the 
nationwide plurality of votes that candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 expects to receive in the local general 
election. 
For a formal characterization of the electoral game see Definition 4 in the appendix, and 
Lemma 4 provides a general characterization of local public goods for economies with blanket 
and closed primary elections. Lemma 5 shows a special case of Lemma 4 in which nominations 
are conducted through a blanket primary election. Theorem 2 shows that the strong 
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decentralization theorem is not satisfied for economies with non-integrated parties and local 
elections, and Theorem 3 shows that Oates’ conventional decentralization theorem holds in the 
case of blanket primaries but fails to hold in the case of closed primaries. 
Lemma 4. For economies with non-integrated parties and democratic decentralization, a 
candidate j of party P in jurisdiction 𝑖 proposes a local public good 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗  satisfying the following: 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ = Υ𝑗𝑃𝑖  (𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖𝐺𝑃0𝑖
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖  𝐺𝑖
∗) (11) 
Where Υ𝑗𝑃𝑖  is a proportionality parameter given by: 
Υ𝑗𝑃𝑖 =
1








 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Γ𝑗𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃1𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃2𝑖  (13) 
Moreover,𝜓𝑗𝑃0𝑖  is a weighted covariance of the change in the marginal probability of the vote of 






 which is 
the change in welfare of each individual voter due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ . In addition, 
𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃0
 is the candidate’s change in the marginal probability of winning the primary election in 













Where 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃0𝑖 is the covariance of the marginal probability of voters in jurisdiction i for 
candidate j of party 𝑃 in the primary and the change in welfare of each resident of jurisdiction i 
due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  
And define 𝜓𝑗𝑝𝐺𝐸𝑖  is a weighted covariance of the change in the marginal probability of the vote 






 is the 
change in the welfare of voter due to a change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ . Moreover, 
𝜕𝛷𝑗𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑖
 is the candidate’s 














Where 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑖 is the covariance of the marginal probability of voters in jurisdiction i for 
candidate j of party 𝑃 in the general election in the electoral state s=1,2 and the change in 
welfare of each resident of jurisdiction i due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  
Proof 
See the appendix. 
Lemma 4 says that sequential elections with a primary and a general elections along with 
democratic decentralization create incentives for candidates of all parties to select a policy 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗  
that is proportional to a linear combination of the ideal policy of all participating primary voters 
of jurisdiction 𝑖 determined by 𝐺𝑃0𝑖
∗  and the ideal policy of all residents of the general election of 
the jurisdiction determined by 𝐺𝑖
∗.23 The parameters 𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 > 0 and 𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖 > 0 represent the 
                                               
23 The ideal policy of general election voters maximizes the net fiscal incidence from local public goods for the 
average voter in the jurisdiction, therefore 𝐺𝑖
∗ = ∑ 𝛼ℎ𝑖
𝑛𝑖
ℎ=1 𝑞⁄ . And the ideal policy of primary election voters 
maximizes the net fiscal incidence of public goods for the average primary voter, therefore 𝐺𝑃0𝑖
∗ = ∑ 𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖
𝑚𝑖
ℎ=1 𝑞⁄ . 
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relative electoral influence of primary and general election voters in jurisdiction 𝑖. Hence, the 
higher 𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 the higher is the change in the number of votes that candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 expects 
to receive in the primary of jurisdiction 𝑖 and candidates have incentives to choose a policy 
closer to the ideal policy of primary voters of that jurisdiction.  
 A similar interpretation is given to the weight of electoral influence of voters 
participating in the general election, given by 𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖 > 0. Hence, the higher 𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖 > 0 the higher is 
the change in the expected number of votes from general election voters in the jurisdiction and 
candidates have incentives to choose a policy closer to the ideal policy of general election voters 
of the jurisdiction, which is given by 𝐺𝑖
∗. Hence the relative electoral influence of primary versus 
general election votes are determined by the relative values of 𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 and 𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖 . If 𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 > 𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖 , 
then primary voters of jurisdiction 𝑖 have a higher electoral weight than general election voters in 
the jurisdiction and the stronger the electoral incentive for candidates to propose the ideal policy 
of the average local primary voter of the jurisdiction. Of particular interest is the case of closed 
primaries in which primary voters might have significant electoral weight (that is 𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 > 𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖  ) 
and therefore, local elections might not lead to middle of the road policies but polarized 
government spending with too much or too little government spending.  
 As we discussed in our previous section, the equilibrium level of 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗  also depends on a 





 which depends on the cost of 
producing public goods 𝑞 and the parameters Θ𝑗𝑃𝑖  and Γ𝑗𝑃𝑖 that explain how the distribution of 
electoral costs associated with the tax burden are aggregated through the political process. 
                                               
Note that 𝑚𝑖 is the number of participating primary voters and 𝑛𝑖 the number of general election voters. In a closed 
primary 𝑚𝑖 < 𝑛𝑖 and in a blanket primary 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖. 
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Higher levels of Θ𝑗𝑃𝑖  and Γ𝑗𝑃𝑖 lead to higher electoral costs for primary and general election 
voters associated with the burden of raising taxes in the jurisdiction and lead to a lower provision 
of 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ . 
 In addition, 𝜓𝑗𝑝𝐺𝐸𝑖  and 𝜓𝑗𝑝0𝑖  are weighted covariances between the marginal probability 
of voting for candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in the general and primary election of jurisdiction 𝑖 and the 
change in the well-being of each voter from an increase in the provision of the local public good. 
As we discussed in the previous section, positive and negative values of 𝜓𝑗𝑝𝐺𝐸𝑖  and 𝜓𝑗𝑝0𝑖 tend to 
move the design of public spending from the center of the distribution of ideal policies of general 
and primary voters in the jurisdiction towards a policy that is polarized and leading towards too 
much government spending if 𝜓𝑗𝑝𝐺𝐸𝑖  and 𝜓𝑗𝑝0𝑖  are positive and too little government spending if 
𝜓𝑗𝑝𝐺𝐸𝑖  and 𝜓𝑗𝑝0𝑖are negative. 
 In what follows, Lemma 5 distinguishes the equilibrium policies for an economy with 
non-integrated parties and blanket primaries. 
Lemma 5. For economies with non-integrated parties, blanket primaries and democratic 
centralization 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐










∗ represent the Pareto efficient local public goods that maximize the social welfare 
gains from inter-regional policy differentiation. 
For economies with non-integrated parties, blanket primaries and democratic decentralization 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝐺𝑖












 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2 (17) 
Proof 
See the appendix. 
 Lemma 5 shows the spending policies for an economy with non-integrated parties, 
blanket primaries and democratic centralization and decentralization. Under these institutions, 
democratic centralization produces the ideal policy of the nationwide average general election 
voter, 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ , and under democratic decentralization the ideal policy of the average voter in each 
jurisdiction, 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ . These outcomes provides several insights: first, our model predicts that party 
integration with a unitary government (see Lemma 2 and condition 3) and party non-integration 
with blanket primaries and a unitary government (see Lemma 5 and condition 16) produce the 
same policies. That is 𝑔𝑐
∗ = 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . However, under local elections, integrated and non-integrated 
parties with blanket primaries do not produce the same policies, that is, 𝑔𝐿𝑖
∗ ≠ 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗  (see the 
equilibrium policies of Lemma 2 and Lemma 5). Hence, the institutions of party integration 
versus non-integration produce different outcomes under national versus local elections. 
 Second, in terms of the efficiency properties and the degree of policy differentiation of 
the equilibrium for economies with non-integrated parties, the implications of Lemma 4 and 
Lemma 5 are the following: for economies with blanket primaries and democratic centralization, 
local public goods with and without spillovers are uniform and Pareto efficient (see condition 16 
of Lemma 5). That is, blanket primaries create electoral incentives for candidates to recognize 
the nationwide distribution of benefits and costs of local public goods. Hence, local public goods 
with and without spillovers are Pareto efficient. 
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 In addition, for economies with non-integrated parties, blanket primaries and democratic 
decentralization, local public goods with inter-regional spillovers are not Pareto efficient; in 
general, 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ < ?̂?𝑖
∗, for either type of primary, blanket or closed. That is, local sequential 
elections do not create incentives to internalize the benefits of local public goods across 
jurisdictions.  
 Third, if local public goods do not have spillovers, then the political institutions of the 
primary election determine whether the decentralized provision of local public goods is Pareto 
efficient or not. In our economy, in blanket primaries all voters participate in the primary and 
general election. Therefore, the average primary voter is also the average general election voter 
in each jurisdiction. Since parties select the ideal policy of the average voter in the jurisdiction, 
local public goods without externalities are Pareto efficient . However, for closed primaries, local 
public goods are not Pareto efficient if the electoral weight of general election voters is 
sufficiently low, that is if 𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖 → 0. In this case, local governments provide a local public good 
that maximizes the well-being of the average primary voter of jurisdiction 𝑖. This means that 
local spending is focalized to benefit a local minoritarian coalition of voters in the jurisdiction 
and therefore public goods are not Pareto efficient. 
 Fourth, the political institutions of primaries also produce different results on the ability 
of local governments to maximize the gains from inter-regional policy differentiation. Under 
blanket primary elections, democratic decentralization produces the ideal policy of the average 
voter in each jurisdiction and maximizes the gains of the society from inter-regional policy 
differentiation. If the primary is closed, then the gains from policy differentiating can be 
maximized only if the electoral weight of primary voters is sufficiently low (that is if 𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 → 0, 
see condition 11 in Lemma 4). If, in contrast, the electoral weight of primary voters is 
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sufficiently high, local governments provide a local public good that maximizes the well-being 
of the average primary voter of jurisdiction 𝑖, which implies that the political process fails to take 
into account the full extent of preferences of all residents in each jurisdiction. As a result, the 
extent of inter-regional policy differentiation achieved by local governments is sub-optimal. 
Non-Integrated Parties with National and Local Elections and Oates’ Decentralization 
Theorem 
On what follows we develop the comparative analysis between national elections and 
local elections in economies with non-integrated parties. Theorem 2 shows that the strong 
decentralization theorem does not hold and Theorem 3 shows that Oates’ decentralization 
theorem is satisfied when primaries are blanket but it is not satisfied if primaries are closed. 
Theorem 2. In democracies with non-integrated parties and blanket primaries, the strong 
decentralization theorem does not hold but the conventional decentralization theorem holds. 
Proof 
See the appendix. 
 Lemma 5 shows that, in systems with non-integrated parties and blanket primaries, 
parties propose the size of public spending that maximizes a unanimous utilitarian social welfare 
function of local residents in each jurisdiction. That is, parties propose the ideal policy of the 
average voter of the jurisdiction and, therefore, the resulting policies are Pareto efficient but only 
for local public goods without spillovers. With spillovers, local spending is not Pareto efficient 
and, therefore, the strong decentralization theorem does not hold for these economies. In 
addition, under blanket primaries, the local provision of public goods maximizes the welfare 
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gains associated with differentiating local policy to the heterogeneous preferences of voters 
across jurisdictions.  
 If the government is democratically centralized and uses blanket primaries, local public 
goods with and without spillovers are uniform and Pareto efficient. In this case, local public 
goods reflect the ideal size on public spending of the average voter of all jurisdictions. Lastly, 
Theorem 2 shows that if local public goods do not display spillovers then democratic 
decentralization dominates centralization because the Pareto efficient and heterogeneous 
provision of local public goods in a democratically decentralized system maximizes the welfare 
gains from policy differentiation, while democratic centralization leads to suboptimal inter-
regional policy differentiation. Consequently, the conventional decentralization theorem of Oates 
(1972) holds for democracies with non-integrated parties and blanket primaries. 
Theorem 3. The strong and the conventional decentralization theorems do not hold in 
democracies with non-integrated parties and closed primaries. 
Proof 
See the appendix. 
 In general, the strong and the conventional decentralization theorems do not hold for a 
democracy with closed primaries.24 As we mentioned before, sequential elections induce 
candidates to propose a policy that reflects a compromise between the ideal policy of the average 
voter of the primary and the ideal policy of the average voter of the general election (see 
                                               
24 A comparison of (2) and (6) shows that the optimal policy for candidates in a nationwide sequential election with 
closed primaries is, in general, different from the spending policy that maximizes the fiscal surplus for all residents 
in the economy. A similar conclusion is reached for local elections in a federation (see conditions 2 and 12). As a 
result, the strong and the conventional decentralization theorems do not hold in with a system of non-integrated 
parties and closed primaries. 
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expressions of Lemmas 3 and 4). In the case of closed primaries, it is likely that minority 
coalitions could have strong electoral influence over local governments that is translated into 
policies that are closer to their preferences. In this case, electoral competition might produce 
extreme policy positions (too much or too little local public spending) instead of the policy that 
maximizes the net fiscal incidence of local public goods for the society. 
 For instance, in condition 6 of Lemma 3, if 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 = 𝑊𝑗𝑃2 ≅ 0, then local elections 
produce the size of public spending in the vicinity of the ideal policy of primary voters in each 
jurisdiction, instead of the ideal policy of all residents in each jurisdiction.25 Simultaneously, we 
can find parametric values of the weight of the electoral influence of primary voters—in which 
democratic centralization averages the political influence of local coalitions of voters—to 
produce a more moderate provision of local public goods that could be welfare superior to the 
less moderate provision of public goods in the democratically decentralized system of local 
governments. This is likely true for an economy with many localities in which the political 
influence of local coalitions is significant over local governments, but the influence of local 
minority groups fades away in the nationwide election. In this setting, the provision of a uniform 
public good by a democratically centralized government could be welfare superior to the 
differentiated but with extreme policy positions produced by a system of democratically 
decentralized local governments.  
                                               
25 In particular, significantly low values of 𝑊𝑗𝑃1 and 𝑊𝑗𝑃2 imply that the marginal change of the joint probability of 
winning the primary and the general election due to a marginal gain from the plurality of the primary is sufficiently 
high (maybe because the candidate who wins the primary would win with almost certainty the general election) and 
therefore candidates will select the ideal policy of a minority of the electorate (i.e. the ideal policy of the average 




In this paper, we analyze how political institutions condition the outcomes of fiscal 
federalism. We develop a formal extension and refinement of Oates’ (1972) decentralization 
theorem, which has provided the basis for much of the research on fiscal decentralization over 
the past five decades. In particular, we provide a political economy analysis of local public good 
provision by incorporating the joint influence of democratic (de)centralization and party 
(non)integration. Our theory generates a number of new insights: first, we show that for 
democracies with integrated parties, a system of elected local governments welfare-dominates a 
centralized government even if local public goods show inter-jurisdictional spillovers. We call 
this result the strong decentralization theorem. When our new theorem is satisfied, the 
conventional decentralization theorem developed by Oates (1972), where local public goods do 
not show spillovers, is also satisfied. Indeed, an important implication of our theoretical model is 
that the combination of democratic decentralization and party integration tends to produce the 
highest welfare gains from the provision of public goods. Democratic decentralization ensures 
that local governments are responsive to the desires of their constituents while party integration 
incentivizes local leaders to pay for goods that may have spillover benefits.  
Second, we show that the strong decentralization theorem does not hold for countries 
with non-integrated parties, whether they have blanket or closed primaries. For countries with 
non-integrated parties and blanket primaries, Oates’ conventional decentralization theorem 
(without spillovers) holds since the political institutions of blanket primaries promote the 
participation of voters and the representation of their preferences into policies. However, 
countries with non-integrated parties and closed primaries, even the conventional 
decentralization theorem does not generally hold. The participation rules of closed primaries 
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induce parties to propose a policy that reflects a compromise between the ideal policy of a 
weighted average voter of the primary and the ideal policy of a weighted average voter of the 
general election. This last finding has particularly important implications for much of the past 
literature. In the case of countries with closed primaries, it is likely that minority coalitions (i.e. 
primary voters) will have strong political influence over central and local governments that is 
translated into policies closer to their preferences. When this happens, electoral competition will 
not necessarily produce Pareto efficient local public goods (even if local public goods do not 
show spillovers). Parties might adopt extreme policy positions with too much or too little local 
public spending compared with the policy that maximizes the surplus from the net fiscal 
exchange for the society as a whole. Another important consequence is that the degree of policy 
differentiation might be suboptimal and might not exhaust the gains from matching the 
preferences of voters across jurisdictions if primary elections are closed. 
In summary, we show that creating locally elected governments can only be expected to 
improve public goods allocation either when parties are integrated or when there are no inter-
jurisdictional spillovers. Local governments controlled by non-integrated parties are not likely to 
provide efficient levels of public goods that spill over into adjacent jurisdictions. Therefore, the 
outcomes from fiscal and democratic decentralization are closely intertwined with the design of 
political parties. All of these institutions must be studied jointly if we are to understand better the 
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Appendix – For Online Publication 
 
Definition 1. Define policy platform of candidate 𝑗 = {1,2} of party P= {𝐴, 𝐵} in district 𝑖 =
{1,2} by 𝑔𝑗𝑃𝑖 . The equilibrium for an economy with party centralization and democratic 
centralization is constituted as follows: 





∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋𝑃  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑗𝑃1 = 𝑔𝑗𝑃2  
Where 𝜋𝑃 is the probability of party P of winning the national election and 𝑔𝑗𝑃1 = 𝑔𝑗𝑃2 is the 
constraint that candidates announce uniform policy platforms in all districts. 




∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋𝑃  ⟹ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑆𝑃 
Otherwise the candidate does not get the nomination and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑆𝑃  
The nomination process implies that all candidates of all parties 𝑃 = {𝐴, 𝐵} select policies 𝑔𝑐𝑃
∗  
in all districts. 
In the second stage, a voter of district 𝑖 = {1,2} with preference αℎ𝑖 for ℎ = 1,2…𝑛𝑖 votes for 
party 𝐴 if  
Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) = {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖 , 𝑔𝑐𝐴
∗ , 𝑔𝑐𝐴
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐴 + 𝜎𝐴ℎ𝑖} − {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖 , 𝑔𝑐𝐵
∗ , 𝑔𝑐𝐵
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐵 + 𝜎𝐵ℎ𝑖} ≥ 0 
Otherwise, she votes for party 𝐵. 
We define 𝛀 as a non-decreasing cumulative distribution of the sequence {Ψ𝐴ℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖)}∀ℎ,∀𝑖 , 
hence 𝛀 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏]. In the third stage, if 𝛀(∀ αℎ𝑖, 𝑖 = {1,2} ∶ Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) > 0) >
1
2
 then party𝐴 wins 
the election and implements 𝑔𝑐𝐴
∗ . Otherwise, party 𝐵 wins and implements 𝑔𝑐𝐵
∗ . 
 
Lemma 1. Local public goods with and without spillovers are Pareto efficient for an economy 
with a majoritarian electoral system, single member jurisdictions, a democratically centralized 
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 ] (𝐴. 2) 
Where 𝛼1 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ1
𝑛1
ℎ=1  is the aggregate intensity of preferences for local public goods of all 
residents in district 1 and 𝛼2 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ2
𝑛2
ℎ=1  is the corresponding aggregate intensity of preferences 
of all residents of district 2. 
Proof 
The problem of policy design for parties P= {𝐴, 𝐵} is 𝛿𝑃 = 𝜋𝑃 subject to 𝑔𝑃1 = 𝑔𝑃2 = 𝑔𝑃. We 

















∗ > 0 (𝐴. 3) 
 
Since the nationwide expected votes for party 𝑃 is given by 𝜙𝑃 = ∑ 𝜙𝑃𝑖
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 is the marginal expected votes from jurisdiction 𝑖. Hence, the first order condition in 


















∗ > 0 (𝐴. 5) 
The parties’ policies converge in probabilistic voting models with homogeneous parties (see 























∗ > 0 (𝐴. 6) 
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Recall 𝜐𝐴ℎ1(𝛼ℎ𝑖 , 𝑔𝐴1, 𝑔𝐴2) = 𝛼ℎ1[𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝐴1) + 𝑘2𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝐴2)] and use the fact 𝑔𝐴1 = 𝑔𝐴2 = 𝑔𝐴𝑐 and 
the budget constraint of the central government given by 𝜏𝐴 =
2𝑝(𝑔𝐴𝑐)
(𝑛1+𝑛2)
 to state ℎ1 as follows: 
ℎ1 = {𝛼ℎ1[𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝐴𝑐) + 𝑘2𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝐴𝑐)] −
2𝑝(𝑔𝐴𝑐)
(𝑛1+𝑛2)




that 𝑔𝐴𝑐 is the only choice variable for party 𝐴. Similarly, ℎ2 can be written as follows 
 ℎ2 = {𝛼ℎ2[𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝐴𝑐) + 𝑘1𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝐴𝑐)] −
2𝑝(𝑔𝐴𝑐)
(𝑛1+𝑛2)
} − {𝛼ℎ2[𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝐵𝑐) + 𝑘1𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝐵𝑐)] −
2𝑝(𝑔𝐵𝑐)
(𝑛1+𝑛2)
} .  
Considering that 𝑔𝐴
∗ = 𝑔𝑐









































∗ > 0 (𝐴. 8) 
 























− 2𝑞 = 0 ∀𝑔𝑐
∗ > 0 (𝐴. 9) 
 
Define 𝛼1 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ1
𝑛1
ℎ=1  as the aggregate intensity of preferences for local public goods of all 
residents in district 1 and 𝛼2 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ2
𝑛2
ℎ=1  is the corresponding aggregate intensity of preferences 
of all residents of district 2, then 𝑔𝑐

























 (𝐴. 11) 
 
Definition 2. Define policy platform of candidate 𝑗 = {1,2} of party P= {𝐴, 𝐵} in the local 
election of district 𝑖 = {1,2} by 𝑔𝑗𝑃𝑖 . The equilibrium for an economy with party integration and 
democratic decentralization is constituted as follows: 
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 In the first stage, candidates 𝑗 of party P announce local policy platforms 𝑔𝐿𝑃𝑖
∗ : 
𝑔𝐿𝑃𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋𝐿𝑃 
Where 𝜋𝐿𝑃 is the joint probability that party P wins elections in districts 1 and 2. 
Party Leaders nominate a candidate to run in the local election of each jurisdiction by selecting 
a candidate 𝑗 = 1 𝑜𝑟 2 to the nomination set 𝑁𝑆𝐿𝑃𝑖  ∀𝑖 if 
 𝑔𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝑔𝐿𝑃𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋𝐿𝑃  ⟹ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑆𝐿𝑃𝑖  ∀𝑖 
Otherwise the candidate does not get the nomination and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑆𝐿𝑃𝑖  
The nomination process implies that parties 𝑃 = {𝐴, 𝐵} nominate a candidate who adopts a 
policy on local public spending of jurisdiction 𝑖, 𝑔𝐿𝑃𝑖
∗  , that maximizes the joint probability that 
party P wins elections in all jurisdictions. 
In the second stage, a voter of jurisdiction 𝑖 with preference αℎ𝑖 for ℎ = 1,2…𝑛𝑖 votes for party 
𝐴 if  
Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) = {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖 , 𝑔𝐿𝐴1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿𝐴2
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐴𝑖 + 𝜎𝐴ℎ𝑖} − {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖 , 𝑔𝐿𝐵1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿𝐵2
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐵𝑖 + 𝜎𝐵ℎ𝑖} ≥ 0 
Otherwise, he or she, votes for party 𝐵. 
We define 𝛀𝒊 as a non-decreasing cumulative distribution of the sequence {Ψ𝐴ℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖)}∀ℎ,∀𝑖 , 




 then party 𝐴 wins the election in the jurisdiction and implements 𝑔𝐿𝐴𝑖
∗ . Otherwise, party 𝐵 
wins and implements 𝑔𝐿𝐵𝑖
∗ . 
 
Lemma 2. Party integration and democratic decentralization lead to a set of Pareto efficient 
local public goods with and without spillovers 𝐠𝐋
∗ = [𝑔𝐿1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿2
∗ ]. At the equilibrium, 𝑔𝐿1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿2
∗ , 
satisfy the following: 
[𝑔𝐿1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿2










For convenience assume party label is 𝑃 = 𝐴. In the local election of district 𝑖 party 𝐴 selects 
𝑔𝐿𝑖
∗ ∈ argmax  𝜋𝐿𝐴 = 𝜋𝐿𝐴(𝜌𝐿𝐴1, 𝜌𝐿𝐴2). The first order condition for an interior maximizer of 










= 0. By definition 
𝜌𝐿𝐴𝑖 = 𝜙𝐿𝐴𝑖 − 𝜙𝐿𝐵𝑖  ∀𝑖 and the sum of the expected votes in jurisdiction 𝑖 for parties 𝐴 and 𝐵 is 






 ∀ 𝑖 .  
The parties’ policies converge in probabilistic voting models with homogeneous parties (see 
Coughlin 1992). The convergence of the parties’ policies 𝑔𝐿𝐴𝑖
∗ = 𝑔𝐿𝐵𝑖
∗ = 𝑔𝐿𝑖





















 are the marginal expected votes for the party in jurisdictions 1 and 2 when 
there is a marginal change in policy 𝑔𝐿1



































∗ > 0 (𝐴. 14) 






 therefore, the first 













































 (𝐴. 16) 
Where 𝛼1 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ1
𝑛1
ℎ=1  and 𝛼2 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ2
𝑛2
ℎ=1  are respectively the aggregate intensities of 
preferences for local public goods of all residents in district 1 and 2. 
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Following similar steps, it can be shown that 𝑔𝐿2





 (𝐴. 17) 
 
Theorem 1. If parties are integrated, then the provision of local public goods with and without 
inter-regional spillovers by a system of democratically elected local governments welfare-
dominates the democratically centralized provision.  
 
Proof 
It is simple to verify that conditions (2), (3) (4), and (5) imply that for ?̂?∗, 𝐠𝐜
∗, 𝐠𝐋






∗ ] and, 𝐠𝐋
∗ = [𝑔𝐿1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿2
∗ ] it is satisfied that ?̂?∗ = 𝐠𝐋
∗ ≠ 𝐠𝐜
∗. Recall that 
?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝑔1, 𝑔2) where 𝑁𝑆𝑊 = ∑ 𝜐ℎ1(𝛼ℎ1, 𝑔1, 𝑔2)
𝑛1
ℎ=1 +
∑ 𝜐ℎ2(𝛼ℎ2, 𝑔2, 𝑔1)
𝑛2
ℎ=1 −  (𝑔1 + 𝑔2). By the strict concavity of 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝑔1, 𝑔2) it is satisfied that 
 𝑁𝑆𝑊(?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2
∗ ) > 𝑁𝑆𝑊((𝑔1, 𝑔2)) ∀ ?̂?𝑖
∗ ≠ 𝑔𝑖  ∀𝑖 (𝐴. 18) 
Since 𝑔𝐿1
∗ = ?̂?𝑖
∗ ∀𝑖 and 𝑔𝑐
∗ ≠ ?̂?𝑖
∗ ∀𝑖 then 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝑔𝐿1
∗ , 𝑔𝐿2
∗ ) > 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝑔𝑐
∗, 𝑔𝑐
∗). This means that 
democratic decentralization welfare dominates democratic centralization even if local public 
goods show spillovers. 
 
Definition 3. The equilibrium for an economy with primary and general elections and 
democratic centralization is constituted as follows: 
In the first stage, candidates 𝑗 = {1,2} of party 𝑃 = {𝐴,𝐵} announce policy platforms in 
jurisdictions 𝑖 = 1,2 given by 𝐺𝑗𝑃1
∗ = 𝐺𝑗𝑃2
∗ = 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  where 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Φ𝑗𝑃  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝑗𝑃1
∗ = 𝐺𝑗𝑃2
∗   
Where 𝛷𝑗𝑃  is the joint cumulative probability that candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 will win the nationwide 
primary and general elections. 
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In the second stage of the game, Nature selects a set of voters who can participate in the 
primary. In each jurisdiction, Nature selects the distribution of qualified voters given by 
{𝛼𝐴1𝑖 , 𝛼𝐴2𝑖  …… . . 𝛼𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑖} and {𝛼𝐵1𝑖 , 𝛼𝐵2𝑖  …… . . 𝛼𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑖} for i=1,2.
26 
The primary election takes place and only qualified primary voters choose between policies of 
candidate 1 and candidate 2 of party 𝑃. Denote 𝐺1𝑃1
∗ = 𝐺1𝑃2
∗ = 𝐺1𝑃𝑐
∗  as the policies of candidate 
1 of party P in districts 1 and 2 and 𝐺2𝑃1
∗ = 𝐺2𝑃2
∗ = 𝐺2𝑃𝑐
∗  are the corresponding policies of 
candidate 2 of party P.  
Thus, primary voters with preference α𝑃ℎ𝑖 for ℎ = 1,2…𝑚𝑖 vote for candidate 1 of party 𝑃 in 
jurisdiction 𝑖 if: 27  
Ψ𝑃ℎ𝑖(α𝑃ℎ𝑖) = {𝜐𝑃ℎ𝑖(𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖 , 𝐺1𝑃1
∗ , 𝐺1𝑃2
∗ ) − 𝜏1𝑃 + 𝜎1𝑃ℎ𝑖} 
−{𝜐𝑃ℎ𝑖(𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖 , 𝐺2𝑃1
∗ , 𝐺2𝑃2
∗ ) − 𝜏2𝑃 + 𝜎2𝑃ℎ𝑖} ≥ 0 
Otherwise they vote for candidate 2 of party P. 
We define 𝛀𝒑 as a non-decreasing cumulative distribution of the sequence {Ψ𝑃ℎ𝑖(α𝑃ℎ𝑖)}∀ℎ,∀𝑖 , 
hence 𝛀𝒑 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏]. In the third stage, if 𝛀𝒑( ∀α𝑃ℎ𝑖:Ψ𝑃ℎ𝑖(α𝑃ℎ𝑖) ≥ 0) >
1
2
 then candidate 1 of 
party P is nominated. Otherwise, candidate 2 of party P is nominated. 
The nomination process means that the candidates’ policies are now adopted by parties. Hence, 
policies of the nominated candidate of party P in jurisdictions 1 and 2, 𝐺𝑗𝑃1
∗ , 𝐺𝑗𝑃2
∗ , become 




In the fourth stage, the nationwide general election takes place and voters vote from the set of 
nominated candidates in each party. Parties A and B postulate policies, 𝐺𝐴1
∗ , 𝐺𝐴2
∗  and 𝐺𝐵1
∗ , 𝐺𝐵2
∗  in 
jurisdictions 1 and 2. Hence voters with preference for local public goods αℎ𝑖 for ℎ = 1,2…𝑛𝑖 in 
jurisdictions 𝑖 = 1,2 vote for party 𝐴 if 
                                               
26 Where the preference parameter 𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖 depicts a voter who can participate in the primary election of party P, 
indexed by ℎ = 1,… 𝑚𝑖 in district i. 
27 In the utility function 𝜐ℎ1(𝛼ℎ𝑖 , 𝐺1𝑃1
∗ , 𝐺1𝑃2
∗ ), the subscripts ℎ𝑖 denote ℎ = 1, …  𝑚 voters and 𝑖 = 1,2 jurisdictions. 
Hence 𝜐ℎ1 depends on policies 𝐺𝐽𝑃𝑖




Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) = {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖, 𝐺𝐴1
∗ , 𝐺𝐴2
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐴 + 𝜎𝐴ℎ𝑖} − {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖, 𝐺𝐵1
∗ , 𝐺𝐵2
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐵 + 𝜎𝐵ℎ𝑖} ≥ 0  
Otherwise they vote for party B. 
Define 𝛀 as a non-decreasing cumulative distribution of the sequence {Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖)}∀ℎ,∀𝑖 , hence 
𝛀 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏].In the fifth stage, if 𝛀( ∀αℎ𝑖:Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) ≥ 0) >
1
2
 then party A wins and implements 
𝐺𝐴1
∗ , 𝐺𝐴2






For the purpose of exposition, we include the extensive form of the game with primary and general elections and democratic 
centralization. 
 




∗  where 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Φ𝑗𝑃    𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑜  𝐺𝑗𝑃1
∗ = 𝐺𝑗𝑃2
∗       
First Stage: Candidates announce policies
Second Stage:
Nature selects voters participating in primary
Voters vote to nominate a candidate
Third Stage: The candidate with majority
of votes win the nomination
Fourth Stage
Voters vote from the set of
Nominated candidates
Fifth Stage
A candidate from some party wins
and forms the government
Candidate 1 
of competing party
In the second stage of the game, in each jurisdiction, Nature selects the distribution of qualified 
voters given by {𝛼𝐴1𝑖 ,𝛼𝐴2𝑖  …… . .𝛼𝐴𝑚 𝑖𝑖} and {𝛼𝐵1𝑖 ,𝛼𝐵2𝑖  …… . .𝛼𝐵𝑚 𝑖 𝑖}  for jurisdictions 𝑖 = 1,2. 
Thus, qualified primary voters with preference α𝑃ℎ𝑖   for ℎ = 1,2…𝑚𝑖  vote for candidate 1 of party 
𝑃 in jurisdiction 𝑖 if  
Ψℎ𝑖(α𝑃ℎ𝑖) = {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖 ,𝐺1𝑃𝑖
∗ ) − 𝜏1𝑃𝑖 + 𝜎1𝑃ℎ𝑖} − {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖 ,𝐺2𝑃𝑖
∗ ) − 𝜏2𝑃𝑖 + 𝜎2𝑃ℎ𝑖} ≥ 0 
Otherwise voters vote for candidate 2 of party P. 
Candidate 2 
of competing party
In the third stage, if  𝛀𝑷𝟎𝒊( ∀αℎ𝑖:Ψℎ𝑖(α𝑃ℎ𝑖) ≥ 0) >
1
2
   then candidate 1 of party P is nominated 
by majority of the votes in the primary and the party´s platform in jurisdiction 𝑖, 𝐺𝑃𝑖
∗ , takes the 
value of 𝐺𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝐺1𝑃𝑖




In the fourth stage, the nationwide general election takes place and voters vote from the set of 
nominated candidates in each party. Parties A and B postulate policies, 𝐺𝐴𝑖
∗  and 𝐺𝐵𝑖
∗  in jurisdiction 
i. Hence voters with preference for local public goods αℎ𝑖   for ℎ = 1,2…𝑛𝑖  in jurisdiction 𝑖 votes 
for party 𝐴 if 
Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) = {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖 ,𝐺𝐴𝑖
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐴𝑖 + 𝜎𝐴ℎ𝑖} − {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖 ,𝐺𝐵𝑖
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐵𝑖 + 𝜎𝐵ℎ𝑖} ≥ 0                  
       Otherwise they vote for party B. 
In the fifth stage, if 𝛀𝒊( ∀αℎ𝑖:Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) ≥ 0) >
1
2
  then party A wins by majority and implements 
𝐺𝐴𝑖




Lemma 3. For economies with non-integrated parties and democratic centralization, a 
candidate j of party P proposes a uniform and Pareto efficient local public good 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  in 
jurisdictions 1 and 2 satisfying the following: 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ = Υ𝑗𝑃𝑐  (𝑊𝑗𝑃01𝐺𝑃01
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃02𝐺𝑃02
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃1  ?̂?1
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃2  ?̂?2
∗) (𝐴. 19) 
Where Υ𝑗𝑃𝑐  is a proportionality parameter given by: 
Υ𝑗𝑃𝑐 =
1
2(Θ𝑗𝑃𝑐 + Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐) −
𝐶𝑜𝑣0 + 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸
𝑞





 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐 =
𝑛1 + 𝑛2
(𝛽𝑗𝑃11 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃21)𝑛1 + (𝛽𝑗𝑃12 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃22)𝑛2
 (𝐴. 21) 
 
Moreover, 𝐶𝑜𝑣0 is a weighted nationwide covariance of the marginal probability of the vote of 






 which is the change 
in welfare of each individual voter due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  . In addition, 
𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃0
 is the 













 (𝐴. 22) 
And 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃0𝑖 is the covariance of the marginal probability of voters in jurisdiction i for candidate 
j of party 𝑃 in the primary and the change in welfare of each resident of jurisdiction i due to a 
marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ .  
Moreover, 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸 is a weighted nationwide covariance of the marginal probability of the vote of 






 which is the change in the welfare 
of each individual voter due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . Moreover, 
𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃𝑠
 is the candidate’s 


















 (𝐴. 23) 
And 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑖 is the covariance of the marginal probability of voters in jurisdiction i for candidate 
j of party 𝑃 in the general election in the electoral state s=1,2 and the change in welfare of each 
resident of jurisdiction i due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ .  
Proof 
For an economy with party non-integration and a single government, candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 
designs public spending to maximize Φ𝑗𝑃  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝑗𝑃1 = 𝐺𝑗𝑃2 = 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐. We impose the 
















= 0 ∀ 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐






 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 0,1,2 is the marginal change in the candidate’s plurality in the 
primary and the general election due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . By definition, the plurality of 

















 is the marginal expected vote for candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in the state of the 
electoral contest 𝑠 = 0,1,2 in jurisdiction 𝑖.  
Since 𝐺𝑗𝑃1 = 𝐺𝑗𝑃2 = 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐 then the nationwide expected votes in the primary election, with 𝑠 =
0, are given by 
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃0
𝜕𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐






) (𝐴. 26) 
And the nationwide expected votes in the general election if candidate 𝑗 faces candidate 𝑠 = 1 or 




















 (𝐴. 28) 






 are, respectively, the expected votes from candidate 𝑗 of 
party 𝑃 if candidate 𝑗 faces candidate 1 of the competing party in jurisdictions 1 and 2. Condition 
(A.28) is the expected votes from candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 if candidate 𝑗 faces candidate 2 of the 
competing party in jurisdictions 1 and 2. 




























) = 0 ∀ 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ > 0 (𝐴. 29) 
In each jurisdiction, Nature selects the distribution of qualified voters given by 
{𝛼𝐴1𝑖 , 𝛼𝐴2𝑖  …… . . 𝛼𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑖} and {𝛼𝐵1𝑖 , 𝛼𝐵2𝑖  …… . . 𝛼𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑖} for i=1,2. In the primary election ℎ =
1,2… .𝑚𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑖 where 𝑚𝑖 is the number of voters voting in the primary election of jurisdiction 𝑖, 
and 𝑛𝑖 is the number of residents of jurisdiction 𝑖. In a blanket primary election 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 and in a 
closed primary election 𝑚𝑖 < 𝑛𝑖.  
The expected votes of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in the primary election (for 𝑠 = 0) in jurisdiction 𝑖 








 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 0, 𝑖 = {1,2} (𝐴. 30) 
In (A.30) the expression 𝐹𝑗𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖 is the marginal probability of the vote for candidate j of party P 
of electoral state s from voter h in district i. 
                                               
28 In condition (A.30) the subscripts in 𝐹𝑗𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖refer to the joint probability of the vote for candidate j of party P of 
electoral state s from voter h in district i.  
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 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = {1,2}, 𝑖 = {1,2} (𝐴. 31) 









































) = 0 ∀ 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ > 0 (𝐴. 32) 
In the previous condition 
𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃0
 is the change in the marginal nationwide probability of candidate 
𝑗 of party 𝑃 of winning the primary election when it chooses 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐




ℎ=1  is the 





ℎ=1  is the corresponding expected vote of candidate in the primary election in 




 is the marginal probability of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 when it chooses 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐 of 





ℎ=1  is the expected vote of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in the general election in 




ℎ=1  is the 
expected vote of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in the general election in jurisdiction 2 when facing 
candidate 1 of the competing party. A similar interpretation is given to the general election when 














From condition (A.30) express 
𝜕𝐹𝑗𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖(𝜀𝐽𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖)
𝜕𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐








 (𝐴. 33) 
From the definition of the covariance between 𝐴 and 𝐵, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐴,𝐵) = 𝐸[𝐴𝐵] − 𝐸[𝐴]𝐸[𝐵]. Re-





and 𝐵 = {
𝜕𝜀𝐽𝑃𝑠ℎ𝑖
𝜕𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐




















































) (𝐴. 34’) 
Use (A.34), (A.34’) into (A.32) to show that 
𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃0






























































































































































 ) = 0 (𝐴. 36) 


















 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 1,2 , 𝑖 = 1,2 (𝐴. 38) 










































) = 0 ∀ 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ > 0 (𝐴. 39) 
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The expected votes of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in the primary election in jurisdictions 1 and 2, are 






































 (𝐴. 41) 
The expected votes of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 when this candidate faces candidates 𝑠 = 1,2 of the 






































 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = {1,2} (𝐴. 43) 








































 (𝐴. 44) 








































 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = {1,2} (𝐴. 45) 
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Use expressions (A.40) to (A.45) into (A.39) to show that the first order condition 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ > 0 
































































2((𝛽𝑗𝑃11 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃21)𝑛1 + (𝛽𝑗𝑃12 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃22)𝑛2) 𝑞
(𝑛1 + 𝑛2)







) as a weighted covariance of the marginal probability of the vote in 






 is the change in the 
welfare of voter due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . In addition, 
𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃0
 is the candidate’s marginal 













 (𝐴. 47) 
And 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸 is a weighted covariance of the marginal probability of the vote in the general 






 is the change in the welfare of voter due to a 
marginal change 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . Moreover, 
𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃𝑠
 is the candidate’s marginal change in the probability of 


















 (𝐴. 48) 
Use, the former definitions in (A.47) and (A.48) and solve for the equilibrium policy 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐






ℎ=1 + 𝑘2 ∑ 𝛼𝑃ℎ1
𝑚1
ℎ=1 ) + 𝛽𝑗𝑃02(∑ 𝛼𝑃ℎ2
𝑚1
ℎ=1 + 𝑘1 ∑ 𝛼𝑃ℎ2
𝑚1
ℎ=1 )
𝑞 (2(Θ𝑗𝑃𝑐 + Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐) −
1
𝑞
(𝐶𝑜𝑣0 + 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸) )
 
+ 
(𝛽𝑗𝑃11 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃21)(∑ 𝛼ℎ1
𝑛1
ℎ=1 + 𝑘2∑ 𝛼ℎ1
𝑛1
ℎ=1 )
𝑞 (2(Θ𝑗𝑃𝑐 + Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐) −
1
𝑞
(𝐶𝑜𝑣0 + 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸) )
 
+ 
(𝛽𝑗𝑃12 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃22)(∑ 𝛼ℎ2
𝑛2
ℎ=1 + 𝑘1∑ 𝛼ℎ2
𝑛2
ℎ=1 )
𝑞 (2(Θ + Γ) −
1
𝑞
(𝐶𝑜𝑣0 + 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸) )
 (𝐴. 49) 




 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐 =
𝑛1 + 𝑛2
(𝛽𝑗𝑃11 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃21)𝑛1 + (𝛽𝑗𝑃12 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃22)𝑛2
 (𝐴. 50) 
In addition, define 𝐺𝑃01
∗  and as 𝐺𝑃02
∗  as the ideal policies of voters participating in the primary 


















 (𝐴. 52) 





















 (𝐴. 54) 
Use (A.50) to (A.54) into (A.49) to express the equilibrium condition 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐














(𝛽𝑗𝑃11 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃21) ?̂?1
∗ + (𝛽𝑗𝑃12 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃22) ?̂?2
∗




 (𝐴. 55) 
For further simplification, define 
𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃0𝑖 > 0 (𝐴. 56) 
𝑊𝑗𝑃1 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃11 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃21 > 0 (𝐴. 57) 
𝑊𝑗𝑃2 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃12 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃22 > 0 (𝐴. 58) 
Use (A.56) to (A.58) to state the equilibrium spending policy in jurisdictions 1 and 2 as follows: 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ = Υ𝑗𝑃𝑐  (𝑊𝑗𝑃01𝐺𝑃01
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃02𝐺𝑃02
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃1  ?̂?1
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃2  ?̂?2




2(Θ𝑗𝑃𝑐 + Γ𝑗𝑃𝑐) −
𝐶𝑜𝑣0 + 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝐺𝐸
𝑞
 (𝐴. 60) 
 
Definition 4. The equilibrium for an economy with primary and general elections and 
democratic decentralization is constituted as follows: 
In the first stage, candidates 𝑗 = {1,2} of party 𝑃 = {𝐴,𝐵} announce policy platforms in 
jurisdiction i, 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗  where 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖   
Where Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖  is the joint cumulative probability that candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 wins the primary and 
general local elections of jurisdiction i. 
In the second stage of the game, in each jurisdiction, Nature selects the distribution of qualified 
voters given by {𝛼𝐴1𝑖 , 𝛼𝐴2𝑖  …… . . 𝛼𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑖} and {𝛼𝐵1𝑖 , 𝛼𝐵2𝑖  …… . . 𝛼𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑖} for jurisdictions 𝑖 = 1,2. 
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The primary election of jurisdiction i takes place and only qualified primary voters choose 
between policies of candidate 1 and candidate 2 of party 𝑃. Denote 𝐺1𝑃𝑖
∗  as the policy of 
candidate 1 of party P in jurisdiction i and 𝐺2𝑃𝑖
∗  as the corresponding policy of candidate 2 of 
party P in jurisdiction i.  
Thus, qualified primary voters with preference α𝑃ℎ𝑖 for ℎ = 1,2…𝑚𝑖 vote for candidate 1 of 
party 𝑃 in jurisdiction 𝑖 if 29  
Ψℎ𝑖(α𝑃ℎ𝑖) = {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖, 𝐺1𝑃𝑖
∗ ) − 𝜏1𝑃𝑖 + 𝜎1𝑃ℎ𝑖} − {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖 , 𝐺2𝑃𝑖
∗ ) − 𝜏2𝑃𝑖 + 𝜎2𝑃ℎ𝑖} ≥ 0 
Otherwise voters vote for candidate 2 of party P. 
Define 𝛀𝑷𝟎𝒊 as a non-decreasing cumulative distribution of the sequence {Ψℎ𝑖(α𝑃ℎ𝑖)}∀ℎ,∀𝑖 , 
hence 𝛀𝑷𝟎𝒊 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏]. In the third stage, if 𝛀𝑷𝟎𝒊( ∀αℎ𝑖: Ψℎ𝑖(α𝑃ℎ𝑖) ≥ 0) >
1
2
 then candidate 1 of 
party P is nominated by majority of the votes in the primary and the party´s platform in 
jurisdiction 𝑖, 𝐺𝑃𝑖
∗ , takes the value of 𝐺𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝐺1𝑃𝑖
∗ . Otherwise, candidate 2 is nominated and the 
party’s platform takes the value 𝐺𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝐺2𝑃𝑖
∗ . 
In the fourth stage, the nationwide general election takes place and voters vote from the set of 
nominated candidates in each party. Parties A and B postulate policies, 𝐺𝐴𝑖
∗  and 𝐺𝐵𝑖
∗  in 
jurisdiction i. Hence voters with preference for local public goods αℎ𝑖 for ℎ = 1,2…𝑛𝑖 in 
jurisdiction 𝑖 votes for party 𝐴 if 
Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) = {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖 , 𝐺𝐴𝑖
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐴𝑖 + 𝜎𝐴ℎ𝑖} − {𝜐ℎ𝑖(𝛼ℎ𝑖, 𝐺𝐵𝑖
∗ ) − 𝜏𝐵𝑖 + 𝜎𝐵ℎ𝑖} ≥ 0  
Otherwise they vote for party B. 
Define 𝛀𝒊 as a non-decreasing cumulative distribution of the sequence {Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖)}∀ℎ,∀𝑖 , hence 
𝛀𝒊 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏]. In the fifth stage, if 𝛀𝒊( ∀αℎ𝑖:Ψℎ𝑖(αℎ𝑖) ≥ 0) >
1
2
 then party A wins by majority and 
implements 𝐺𝐴𝑖
∗ . Otherwise, party B wins and implements 𝐺𝐵𝑖
∗  
 
                                               
29 In the net payoff Ψℎ𝑖(α𝑃ℎ𝑖) of voter with preference 𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖, the expression 𝜎1𝑃ℎ𝑖 refers to a stochastic factor of 
candidate 1 of party P that is specific to voter ℎ in district 𝑖. A similar interpretation is given to 𝜎2𝑃ℎ𝑖. 
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Lemma 4. For economies with non-integrated parties and democratic decentralization, a 
candidate j of party P in jurisdiction 𝑖 proposes a local public good 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗  satisfying the following: 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ = Υ𝑗𝑃𝑖  (𝑊𝑗𝑃01𝐺0𝑖
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖  𝐺𝑖
∗) (𝐴. 61) 
Where Υ𝑗𝑃𝑖  is a proportionality parameter given by: 
Υ𝑗𝑃𝑖 =
1
(Θ𝑗𝑃𝑖 + Γ𝑗𝑃𝑖) −
𝜓𝑗𝑃0𝑖 + 𝜓𝑗𝑝𝐺𝐸𝑖
𝑞





 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Γ𝑗𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃1𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃2𝑖  (𝐴. 63) 
Moreover,𝜓𝑗𝑃0𝑖  is a weighted covariance of the change in the marginal probability of the vote of 






 which is the 
change in welfare of each individual voter due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖




the candidate’s change in the marginal probability of winning the primary election in 










𝑚𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃0𝑖  (𝐴. 64) 
Where 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃0𝑖 is the covariance of the marginal probability of voters in jurisdiction i for 
candidate j of party 𝑃 in the primary and the change in welfare of each resident of jurisdiction i 
due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  
And 𝜓𝑗𝑝𝐺𝐸𝑖  is a weighted covariance of the change in the marginal probability of the vote of 






 is the 
change in the welfare of voter due to a change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . Moreover, 
𝜕𝛷𝑗𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑖
 is the candidate’s 













 (𝐴. 65) 
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Where 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑖 is the covariance of the marginal probability of voters in jurisdiction i for 
candidate j of party 𝑃 in the general election in the electoral state s=1,2 and the change in 




In a federation with party non-integration, the spending policy of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in 
district 𝑖 is 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖  (𝐴. 66) 
Where Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖  is the joint probability of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 of winning the local primary and 















∗  = 0 ∀𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖






∗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 0,1,2 is the marginal change in the candidate’s plurality in the local 
primary (for 𝑠 = 0) and the general election (for 𝑠 = 1,2) of jurisdiction 𝑖 due to a marginal 
change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ .  
Nature selects the distribution of qualified voters given by {𝛼𝐴1𝑖 , 𝛼𝐴2𝑖  …… . . 𝛼𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑖} and 
{𝛼𝐵1𝑖 , 𝛼𝐵2𝑖  …… . . 𝛼𝐵𝑚𝑖𝑖} for jurisdictions 𝑖 = 1,2. Recall that in the local primary election ℎ =
1,2… .𝑚𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑖 where 𝑚𝑖 is the number of voters voting in the primary election of jurisdiction 𝑖, 
and 𝑛𝑖 is the number of residents of jurisdiction 𝑖. In a blanket primary election 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 and in a 
closed primary election 𝑚𝑖 < 𝑛𝑖.  












 (𝐴. 68) 
Where 𝐹𝑗𝑃0ℎ𝑖( 𝑗𝑃0ℎ𝑖) is the probability of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 in the primary election, 𝑠 = 0, 
that voter with preference 𝛼𝑃ℎ𝑖 votes for her(him) in jurisdiction 𝑖. 
 
73 












 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = {1,2} (𝐴. 69) 
Use (A.68) and (A.69) to state the first order condition of the candidate’s problem of policy 

























)  = 0 ∀𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖












 (𝐴. 71) 

































) (𝐴. 72) 

























) (𝐴. 73) 





























































))  = 0 (𝐴. 74) 


















 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 1,2 (𝐴. 76) 





































) (𝐴. 77) 















 (𝐴. 78) 
The expected votes of candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 when this candidate faces candidates 𝑠 = 1,2 of the 











∗ − 𝑞 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = {1,2} (𝐴. 79) 

















) (𝐴. 80) 











∗ − 𝑞)  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = {1,2} (𝐴. 81) 
Use expressions (A.80) to (A.81) into (A.77) to show that the first order condition 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ > 0 




































∗ − 2𝑞) = 0 (𝐴. 82) 
The equilibrium policy 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐





ℎ=1 ) + (𝛽𝑗𝑃1𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃2𝑖)(∑ 𝛼ℎ𝑖
𝑛𝑖
ℎ=1 )
















 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Γ𝑗𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃1𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃2𝑖  (𝐴. 83) 
In addition, define 𝐺0𝑖







 (𝐴. 84) 
Moreover, define 𝐺𝑖
∗ as the ideal policy of voters participating in the general election (that is all 







 (𝐴. 85) 
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For further simplification, define 
𝑊𝑗𝑃0𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃0𝑖 > 0 (𝐴. 86) 
𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽𝑗𝑃1𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝑃2𝑖 > 0 (𝐴. 87) 
In addition, define,𝜓𝑗𝑃0𝑖 as a weighted covariance of the marginal probability of the vote of 






 which is the 
change in welfare of each individual voter due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖















𝑚𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗𝑃0𝑖  (𝐴. 88) 
And define 𝜓𝑗𝑝𝐺𝐸𝑖  as a weighted covariance of the change in the probability of the vote of 






 is the 
change in the welfare of voter due to a marginal change 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . Moreover, 
𝜕Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜌𝑗𝑃𝑠𝑖
 is the candidate’s 













 (𝐴. 89) 
Use (A.84) to (A.89) to state the equilibrium spending policy in jurisdiction 𝑖 is: 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ = Υ𝑗𝑃𝑖  (𝑊𝑗𝑃01𝐺0𝑖
∗ +𝑊𝑗𝑃𝑖  𝐺𝑖




(Θ𝑖 + Γ𝑖) −
𝜓𝑗𝑝0𝑖 + 𝜓𝑗𝑝𝐺𝐸𝑖
𝑞
 (𝐴. 91) 
 
Lemma 5. For economies with non-integrated parties with blanket primaries and democratic 
centralization 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐









 (𝐴. 92) 
Where ?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2
∗ represent the Pareto efficient local public goods that maximize the social welfare 
gains from inter-regional policy differentiation. 
For economies with non-integrated parties, blanket primaries and democratic decentralization 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝐺𝑖










 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2 (𝐴. 93) 
Proof 
For an economy with party non-integration and a single government, candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 
designs public spending to maximize Φ𝑗𝑃  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝑗𝑃1 = 𝐺𝑗𝑃2 = 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐. We impose the 















= 0 ∀ 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐






 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 0,1,2 is the marginal change in the candidate’s plurality in the 
primary and the general election due to a marginal change in 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ . 
With blanket primaries the distribution of primary and general election voters is the same. 
Therefore, all candidates of all parties converge in selecting 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Φ𝑗𝑃  since they 
maximize a continuous and strictly concave probability function of winning the joint primary 


























 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 0,1,2 (𝐴. 96) 























 correspond to the expected votes in jurisdictions 1 and 2 that policy 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  
can be delivered in the primary and general nationwide elections. 
The expected votes of any candidate 𝑗 of any party 𝑃 in the primary and general election in 










 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2 (𝐴. 98) 
The convergence of the candidates’ policies implies 
𝜕𝐹𝑗𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜀𝑗𝑃𝑖
 is a constant. Hence the first order 
















= 0 (𝐴. 99) 






































 (𝐴. 101) 
The equilibrium policy 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐





ℎ=1 + 𝑘2∑ 𝛼ℎ1
𝑛2
ℎ=1 ) + (∑ 𝛼ℎ2
𝑛2




 (𝐴. 102) 
Recall 𝛼1 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ1
𝑛1
ℎ=1  is the aggregate intensity of preferences for local public goods of all 
residents in district 1 and 𝛼2 = ∑ 𝛼ℎ2
𝑛2
ℎ=1  is the corresponding aggregate intensity of preferences 
of all residents of district 2. State the equilibrium policy 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐

























 (𝐴. 104) 
 
Blanket primaries and democratic decentralization 
For an economy with party non-integration and democratic decentralization, candidate 𝑗 of party 
𝑃 in jurisdiction 𝑖 designs public spending to maximize Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖 . The first order condition for the 















∗  = 0 ∀𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ > 0 (𝐴. 105) 
With blanket primaries the distribution of primary and general election voters is the same and all 
candidates of all parties converge in selecting 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖  since they maximize a 
continuous and strictly concave probability function of winning the joint primary and general 















∗  (𝐴. 106) 










= 0 (𝐴. 107) 
The convergence of the candidates’ policies implies 
𝜕𝐹𝑗𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝜀𝑗𝑃𝑖













∗ − 𝑞 = 0 (𝐴. 108) 
Therefore, for economies with non-integrated parties, blanket primaries, and democratic 
decentralization, 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖












Theorem 2. In democracies with non-integrated parties and blanket primaries, the strong 
decentralization theorem does not hold but the conventional decentralization theorem holds. 
Proof 
The equilibrium provision of local public goods for economies with party non-integration and 
local elections is not Pareto efficient for local public goods with spillovers. Therefore, the strong 
decentralization theorem does not hold.  
Conventional Decentralization Theorem 
Now we proceed to analyze whether the conventional decentralization theorem holds in 
economies with party non-integration and blanket primaries. To do so, consider the case in which 
local public goods do not show spillovers then 𝑘1 = 𝑘2 = 0. Note that local spending for an 
economy with a nationwide primary and general elections 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗  is Pareto efficient and the 











∗ ] = [?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2






 ] (𝐴. 111) 
By Lemma 5, for economies with non-integrated parties with blanket primaries and democratic 
decentralization 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖










 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2 (𝐴. 112) 
Recall ?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝑔1, 𝑔2) where 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝑔1, 𝑔2) is the nationwide welfare under the 
provision of public goods in jurisdictions 1 and 2 given by 𝑔1, 𝑔2.  
By the strict concavity of 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝑔1, 𝑔2) it is satisfied that 𝑁𝑆𝑊(?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2
∗) > 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝑔1, 𝑔2) ∀?̂?𝑖
∗ ≠
𝑔𝑖  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2. Since 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ = ?̂?𝑖
∗ for 𝑖 = 1,2 and 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ ≠ ?̂?𝑖
∗ for 𝑖 = 1,2 then 
 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝐺𝑗𝑃1
∗ , 𝐺𝑗𝑃2
∗ ) > 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ , 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ ) (𝐴. 113) 
This means that the provision of public goods under democratic decentralization 𝐺𝑗𝑃1
∗ , 𝐺𝑗𝑃2
∗  is 
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welfare superior than the provision under democratic centralization 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ , 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ , and therefore, the 




Theorem 3. The strong and the conventional decentralization theorems do not hold in 
democracies with non-integrated parties and closed primaries. 
Proof 
A candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 seeking to form a central government in party non-integrated regimes 
with closed primaries selects 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Φ𝑗𝑃  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝑗𝑃1
∗ = 𝐺𝑗𝑃2
∗  Moreover ?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2
∗ ∈
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑁𝑆𝑊(𝑔1, 𝑔2) where ?̂?1
∗, ?̂?2
∗ are the policies that maximize the nationwide surplus from 
the fiscal exchange associated with local public goods. Lemma 3 implies that 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑐
∗ ≠ ?̂?𝑖
∗ for 𝑖 =
1,2.  
Similarly, in a system of local governments with party non-integration and closed primaries, a 
candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑃 selects 𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Φ𝑗𝑃𝑖  for 𝑖 = 1,2. Lemma 4 shows that, in general, 
𝐺𝑗𝑃𝑖
∗ ≠ ?̂?𝑖









∗ ) (𝐴. 114) 
And the strong and conventional decentralization theorems, in general, do not hold. 
